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ABSTRACT
Recent studies of labour have clearly established that the
capitalist state is very involved in the recruitment, relocation
and retention of migrant labour forces . Most of the literature
tends to analyze migrant labour within the broader social,
political and economic context f expanding capitalism .
Consequently, studies tend to focus on how the use of migrant
labour is profitable to capitalism because it is cheap and easy
to exploit . Such studies, however, neglect the ways in which the
state actually intervenes in the labour market in order to
facilitate the flow of migrant workers to places of employment .
Therefore, this thesis explores the relationship between the
migration of labour, the state and the reserve army of labour
through an analysis of the Native migrant work force in the sugar
beet industry in southern Alberta .
Through the use of archival material, which includes various
federal and provincial documents, annual reports of the Alberta
Sugar Beet Growers' Association, newspapers and other materials,
the circumstances underlying state intervention in the economy of
the southern sugar beet industry became clear
. While analyzing
the structure of the sugar beet industry in southern Alberta, it
was found that throughout much of the history of the sugar beet
industry, farmers received low returns for their beet crops .
Moreover, farmers also suffered financially from the high cost of
machinery and, more recently, from the increased costs for
fertilizer and chemical weed controls .
An examination of government documents on the Federal-
Provincial Agricultural Manpower Committee, whose mandate was to
recruit workers and move them to areas of need in agricultural
sectors throughout Canada, revealed that the federal part of the
committee was represented by officials from the Department of
Manpower and Immigration and, beginning in the early 1950s,
officials from the Department of Indian Affairs, who represented
Indians on reserves .
When the working conditions in sugar beet industry were
examined, it was found that they were very poor for beet workers .
In general, the weeding and hoeing of the sugar beets was
difficult and the housing accommodations inadequate . Moreover,
because of the low return on their beet crops and the high costs
of machinery, fertilizer and weed control, the farmers had to
keep the cost of labour as low as possible, which, meant paying
low wages to beet workers . Moreover, it was found that throughout
much the history of the sugar beet industry in southern Alberta,
agricultural workers were unprotected by labour laws, which, was
very conducive t reproducing conditions for cheap labour .
Consequently, few wanted to work in the beet fields of southern
Alberta if other employment could be found .
Prior to the 1950s the state recruited
vii
immigrant workers and
even prisoners of war from internment camps to supply farmers
with the needed labour for their beet crops . However, in the
early 1950s unskilled immigrant labour could no longer be
procured for beet work . It was at this time that the sugar beet
industry, through the Federal-Provincial Agricultural Manpower
Committee, turned to recruiting
viii
Natives, particularly northern
Alberta and northern Saskatchewan reserve Indians, to perform
their labour requirements . In order to maintain this needed work
force, the state helped organize Native migratation to southern
Alberta at the start of the beet season and also helped ensure
that they stayed there for the duration of the needed period .
Introduction
In recent years, many capitalist countries have experienced
an increase in the use of migrant labour forces . Migrant labour
is generally understood to refer to the movement of workers
between regions or between nations in order to sell their labour
power in the receiving areas . The notion of migrant labour is
also understood to refer to temporary settlement in the host
region or country for the purpose of material and social
advancement in the home region upon return .(1)
A growing body
	
f literature on the subject clearly
establishes the fact that the state is very involved in the
inducement and the regulation of migrant labour forces (eg :
Castles and Kosack, 1973 ; Castells, 1975 ; Burawoy, 1976 ; and
Portes, 1978) . The classic example is the case of South Africa
where state imposed policies and regulations forced indigenous
workers to migrate between their reserves and surrounding gold
mines . Most studies tend to analyze migrant labour within the
broader social, political and economic context of expanding
capitalism . Thus, they usually focus on how the use of migrant
labour is profitable to capitalism because it is cheap and easy
to exploit as a result of its weak political position in the
host country .(2) Some studies also argue that the use of migrant
labour serves to lower the cost of reproduction of labour because
(2)
once the receiving area is done with the labour force, it simply
sends it home where it is maintained until capital requires it
again .(3) So, in an abstract way these studies tend to explain
"why" capital uses migrant labour and "how" state policies and
regulations function to "induce" the flow of migrant workers .
But, what they are not clear on is the ways in which the state
may actually intervene in the process to facilitate the flow of
workers from their home region to the host region .
The purpose of this research is to analyze a specific case
of migrant labour within the Marxist framework and discuss the
relationship between migration, the state and the reserve army f
labour . The case that will be analyzed
workers who were recruited from reserves in northern
is the Native migrant
labour force which was initially introduced to southern Alberta's
sugar beet industry in the mid-1950s and still comprises the
majority of the workforce today . The high point of this labour
force was in 1966 when it had increased to over 3000 Indian
Alberta and
northern Saskatchewan . (4)
In Canada, the term "Native" refers to the Indian, Inuit and
Metis . However, the focus of this study will be on status Indians
from reserves as they formed the largest group of migrant workers
in the southern Alberta sugar beet industry since the mid-1950s .
Although the Metis have worked in the sugar beet industry as long
as Indians, they comprised a much smaller part of the workforce
and therefore are paid less attention . As for the Inuit, no
information has been found regarding their participation in the
sugar beet industry of southern Alberta and thus they are not
mentioned in this study .
The fundamental question this research will address is as
follows : "What has been the role of the state concerning the
migration of Native labour to southern Alberta's sugar beet
industry?" . Chapter one will discuss the Marxist concept of the
reserve army of labour and the Marxist conception of the
capitalist state . Also, the institutions of the state will be
discussed to point out the unequal structure of representation in
the capitalist state . Chapter two will discuss the state's
policies in relation to status Indians in Canada . In doing so, it
will be revealed how the state was in a position to create and
reproduce a system of Indian migrant labour for southern
Alberta's sugar beet industry . Chapter three will analyze the
structure of the sugar beet industry in southern Alberta . It will
focus on the prices farmers received for sugar beets and their
problems of production during the period Natives formed the
majority of the workforce . Chapter four will clarify how state
intervention facilitated the recruitment, movement and retention
of Native workers for the sugar beet industry in southern
Alberta . particular, because the Indian Affairs Branch
(currently the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development) was responsible for Indians on reserves during the
period under discussion, the role that it played in the
(3)
(4)
procurement of Indian workers for the sugar beet industry will be
addressed . Chapter five discusses the working conditions of
Natives in the sugar beet industry . It also discusses the racism
that Natives experienced while employed in the sugar beet
industry . The last chapter provides a summary of the findings of
the study .
Chapter One : TheReserveArmyofLabourandtheCapitalistState
In this chapter the link between migration, the reserve
army of labour concept and the capitalist state are explored . As
well, the unequal representation between the institutions that
make up the state
the Department f Indian Affairs and Northern Development is
discussed in relation to the institutions of the state that
represent development interests .
The Reserve Army of Labour
In order to understand the concept of the reserve army of
labour, it is first necessary to understand Marx's labour theory
of value . The labour theory of value postulates that the value of
a commodity is determined by the amount of socially necessary
labour time needed to produce the commodity
. A central part of
the labour theory of value is the difference between use value
and exchange value of commodities . Use. value is the utility that
people derive from a commodity and exchange value is the selling
value of a commodity
. According to labour theory of value, labour
power is also a commodity but it is unique among commodities
because it has the capacity to create value . Under capitalism,
the use value f labour is equivalent to the value of the
commodities that the labour power- produces whereas, the exchange
(5)
are discussed . In particular, the position of
(6)
value of labour power is equal to the wage that is received .(5)
Thus, exploitation is the difference between the use value of
labour power and its exchange value .
	
discussing the labour
theory of value, Satzewich states :
Under capitalism, labour power is also a commodity
which possesses the same twofold- value dimension as
other commodities . The wage constitutes the exchange
value of labour power . Capitalists purchase a certain
length of time during which they maintain the right to
the use of labour power . They can therefore organize
the production process, or the specific combination of
of variable and fixed capital, to ensure that the
workers produce commodities with a value greater than
what they receive as a wage . The utility of labour ,
power to the capitalist, then, is not simply that it
can be put to work to produce commodities, but that
it has the special capacity to produce commodities
which possess values greater than it itself has . That
is, it can produce surplus value, or values created by
the labourer after creating sufficient values to ensure
the reproduction of his/her labour power . Because of
the nature of the exchange process, the surplus value
produced by the worker is the property of the owner of
the means of production .(6)
The surplus value appropriated by the capitalist can only be
realized if the commodities are sold in the market . However,
capitalist--
production is competitive production as different
production units attempt to sell more commodities than their
direct competitors . One means of selling more commodities than a
competitor is to reduce the selling price of the commodity
. The
reduction in the selling price of the commodity can be
accomplished by - lowering the cost of its production
. This entails
(7)
lowering the cost of labour power . Satzewich states : "Because all
value is derived from the application of labour power to the
means of production, in order to lessen the cost of production of
the commodity, the capitalist must try to cheapen the cost of
labour power ."(7)
one way capitalists lower the costs of labour power is by
using the surplus value produced in prior production cycles to
invest in machinery . The use of machines lessen the labour power
needed to produce a specific amount of goods thereby increasing
the capitalist's relative surplus value . That is, "an increase In
relative surplus value is obtained by shortening that part of the
working day during which the worker reproduces the equivalent of
his/her wage ."(8)
When machines are used to increase the relative surplus
value, there results a reduction
fewer workers are needed to produce
	
specific amount of
commodities than was required previously .(9) In Marx's view,
this process generates an "Industrial reserve army of labour" or
a "relative surplus population" of unemployed labour . He states :
in the demand for labour because
. . . it Is capitalist accumulation itself that con-
stantly produces, and produces in the direct ratio
of its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant
population of labourers, i .e ., a population of greater
extent that suffices for the average needs of the
self-expansion of capital, and therefore a surplus-
population .(10)
(8)
It should be noted however, in some instances where the
reinvestment of surplus value is sufficiently great and even if
labour-saving technology is introduced, there can be an increased
demand for labour . For example, reinvestment of surplus value may
create a new plant and increase the demand for labour . As well,
in cases where the introduction of new technology breaks down
tasks formerly performed by skilled labour, unskilled or semi-
skilled labour may be hired in greater numbers to take its place
and at wage levels that do not require greater output in
wages .(11) Therefore, sometimes the process of capital
accumulation increases the demand for labour .
Marx identified three components of the reserve army of
labour : the floating, the latent, and the stagnant sectors .(12)
The "floating" sector is located around centers of industry and
employment and consists of workers who have been replaced by
mechanization. These workers are hired and discarded by movements
of capital and technology and thus suffer from sporadic
unemployment or underdevelopment . The "latent" sector is found in
the agricultural areas . Once human labour is replaced by machines
in these areas, no - counter movement develops which would employ
the masses of displaced workers and thus they are forced to move
to the cities to sell their labour power . Lastly, Marx identifies
a "stagnant" sector of the reserve army of labour which consists
of individuals whose employment I
	
irregular, casual, and
marginal . This sector furnishes capital with 'an inexhaustible
(9)
reservoir of disposal labour power', whose 'conditions of life.
sink below the average normal level of the working class' .(13)
Capitalism is characterized by uneven development within a
national economy and between national economies . The various
production units within a social formation undergo different
forms of structural transformations, and thus they have different
labour force requirements . In some sectors of a national economy
structural transformations may lead to the expulsion of workers
from production . Conversely, structural transformations in other
sectors of the same national - economy may result in the
recruitment of new labour .(14) This demand for new labour may be
filled by mobilization of workers from the reserve army of
labour . Thus, migration occurs when workers from the reserve army
of labour move to fill available job positions in areas of labour
shortage . Satzewich states :
. . .migration tends to be defined as both a cause and
consequence of the process of capital accumulation .
Capital accumulation initially propels or forces
certain groups of people to migrate because of the
associated economic dislocations which accompany it .
Capital accumulation is also the stimulus to migration
to the extent that it constitutes the conditions which
give rise to labour shortages and points of attraction
for wage labour .(15)
In some Instances, however, the reserve army of labour is
threatened by an exhaustion of the indigenous labour supply or by
the unwillingness of the workers to work for low wages .(16)
Labour shortage puts pressure on wages to rise and thus may make
production unprofitable . In other words, higher wage rates
increase labour costs for capitalists which decrease their rate
of profit . As noted previously, one way to lower the high cost of
labour is to invest in machinery . However, another way that
capitalists have dealt with the rise in labour costs is to find a
cheaper source of labour either domestically or through the
importation of foreign workers . fact, capitalist countries
extract workers from foreign reserve armies of labour even during
times when there is a surplus of unused domestic labour -=The
reason for this is explained by Bolaria and Li as follows :
"Immigrant labour . . . does not merely increase the supply of labour
but also replaces high cost labour, and weakens the
organizational efforts and bargaining position of the domestic
workforce . For this reason, immigrant and migrant workers have
often been recruited even when a domestic labour surplus
exists ."(17) Immigrant labour is also advantageous to capitalist
production because it is easily exploited . The tenuous political
status of immigrant workers in the host country means they are
vulnerable to threats and repression by their employers, the
state and the indigenous workforce .(18)
Another way of reducing the cost of labour is through
racism
. Bolaria and Li argue that within capitalism, "maximal
accumulation of profit . . .depends on the dirty work at the
production level being carried out at a low cost ."(19) Given
that
activities
confine a
rates .
attributes
accumulation of wealth leads to increased economic
and opportunities of mobility, the problem is how to
pool of workers to performing dirty work at low wage
Bolaria and Li argue that skin colour and physical
of the subordinate group have become a convenient
solution to this problem . They state :
Skin colour, hitherto an irrational attribute, now
provides the basis for assigning a group of
socially-defined undersirables to undersirable jobs .
There is a new r ationality . i n skin colour because
a definite economic value . i s associated with it . As
the physical characteristics of a group are repeatedly
paired with dirty work, the social standing of the-
group gets to be defined, in part by the work it does .
Over time, the cultural and physical characteristics
of a subordinate group become inseparable from its
work role and its subservient position . Race, as
superfically defined by skin colour, takes on a social
meaning and significance .(20)
The dominant group has the power to defined racially
subordinate groups on the basis of skin colour and other physical
and social characteristics, which, serve as a justification for
their exploitation and performance of dirty work . As well, the
dominant-group, uses its position to assert an ideology that it is
superiorr in comparison to other racially defined groups .(21)
Thus, the utility of racism is rooted in the economic benefits
that it helps secure for the dominant group in capitalist
society. Immigrant and migrant workers are used by capitalist
societies as a source of cheap labour and racism serves to lower
the cost of this labour even more .
Under capitalism, the movement of individuals out of the
reserve army of labour and into available working positions
usually occurs on the basis of market mechanisms . In some cases
however, the state intervenes in order to facilitate and regulate
the flow between the reserve army of labour and the labour
market .
The Capitalist State
Most advanced capitalist countries are characterized as
being liberal-democratic in form . In this view, society is
composed of
	
plurality of groups whose existence is the outcome
of diverse economic, socio-cultural, and geographic
characteristics of society . The state is seen as autonomous and
neutral in relation to class conflict . In the Marxist perspective
however, capitalist society is understood in terms of its mode of
production which creates relations of domination and exploitation
and thereby produces antagonistic social classes . The state is
seen as ;:functioning to maintain these relations . The liberal-
democratic view of the state as a neutral arbitrator in class
conflict is unable to comprehend the contradictory fact that its
actions (policies) perpetuate social inequalities .(22)
Within the Marxist perspective, the nature, structure and
role of the state is determined or constrained by the mode of
(12)
(13)
production .(23) Thus, within the capitalist mode of production a
fundamental role of the state is to create the conditions for
capitalist accumulation . This entails maintaining the relations
of exploitation between the classes upon which accumulation is
based . The basis of exploitation between the classes (the
difference between the use value of labour and its exchange
value) has been discussed previously in Marx's theory of labour
and, ,
although the state plays the role of mediator between the
classes, it exercises its power to the benefit of the long-term
interests of capital .(24)
In order for the state function in the interests of
capital however, it needs to be relatively autonomous from the
capitalist class . Panitch states : "For the state to act only at
the behest of particular segments of the bourgeoisie would be
dysfunctional to it managing the common affairs of that class .
For it to accomplish this task, it needs a degree of independence
from that class ; a 'relative autonomy l" .(25)
For instance, the
state may intervene to save the bourgeoisie from itself as the
individual capitalists in their relentless pursuit for profit
threaten--=- to destroy the very basis of bourgeois wealth and
accumulation by the draining of labour power, which, creates
class struggle and conflict . The state's role in class struggle
is to resolve the issue without revolution and at the same time
protect the common interest of the bourgeoisie . Panitch states
:
(14)
. . .the capitalist state must try to fulfill two
basic and often mutually contradictory functions-
---accumulation and legitimization . . . . This means that
the state must try to maintain or create the conditions
in which profitable capital accumulation is possible
.
However, the state also must try to maintain or create
conditions for social harmony . A capitalist state that
openly uses its coercive forces to help one class
accumulate capital at the expense of other classes
loses its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis
its loyalty and support .(26)
Besides the state's two basic functions of formulating policies
which will create capital accumulation and social harmony, it
also performs a "coercive function"
. That is, the state has the
legitimacy to use force to maintain or impose social order .
However, the state usually does not need to use the coercion
function to facilitate capital accumulation and legitimize social
inequality .(27) This follows because social control is maintained
through state welfare policies . The formulation of such policies
serves to
	
reproduce labour power and maintain the non-working
population .(28) Thus social welfare programs are a means of
reducing working-class conflict and therefore offer an effective
means of social control .(29)
A Marxist understanding of the state also requires that the
institutions which comprise the state be clearly defined . This
follows because it is through the institutions of the state that
class struggle is expressed and represented . However, the
representative structure within the state is unequal
. once this
unequal structure of representation which has evolved over time
in a given social formation is identified "it becomes possible to
link a particular policy instance to the effective 'national
policy' by tracing the relation of the forces involved to the
broader structure of representation" .(30) It is this unequal
structure of representation which allows the state to function as
the organizer of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie . Mahon states :
. . .the state is forced to organize the consent of the
subordinate classes to bourgeoisie domination and, at
the same time, to arrange a consensus uniting the
bourgeoisie in order to facilitate capitalist
accumulation and to permit the . bourgeoisie as a whole
to remain the dominant class . This increasingly
involves the state in specific forms of economic
intervention .In order to intervene effectively, the
state has centralized authoritative decision-making in
the hands of the executive . . .who command a
hierarchically ordered group of career civil servants
recruited on the basis of their 'expertise' . Inscribed
in this hierarchical arrangement is the unequal
structure of representation which permits the state to
organize hegemony .(31)
latter sub-levels include
(15)
In Canada the state is a complex of institutions, including
government and its bureaucracies, the military, the judiciary,
representative assemblies and the sub-levels of government . The
provincial executives, legislatures,
and bureaucracies, as well as municipal governmental
institutions .(32) The most prominent of these institutions,
however, is the federal administrative apparatus because of its
jurisdiction in the area of key policy formulation . Within this
administrative apparatus, the various fractions of the dominant
(16)
class or "power bloc" are represented .(33)
In the case of Canada, it is the Department of Finance which
constitutes the "seat of power" of the hegemonic fraction . Its
dominance over the budgetary process permits it to strongly
influence the programs elaborated by the other federal
departments . Also, Finance's role in training those who later
head other departments enables it to promote
	
particular
perspective in relation to the "national interest" . That is,
through Finance's training function the dissemination of the
concept of national interest cre-ates "a level of ideological
coherence in government policy ensuring that those who'represe-nt'
non-hegemonic forces basically accept the development philosophy
that serves the fundamental interest of the hegemonic
fraction ."(34)
The federal administration apparatus represents not only the
dominant classes but also the subordinate classes . But the mode
of representation differs significantly between the two groups .
The representatives of all social forces have a dual role . One is
to "represent" the specific interests of their respective groups
in the negotiation process . Another is to act as "regulator" in
the attempt td persuade and/or coerce their group into accepting
the proposed compromise . This dual role of representation is a
critical factor in the functioning of the state as organizer of
the hegemonic fraction . That is, although the interests of the
dominated classes must be taken into account, "their subordinate
position in civil society poses definite limits to their
participation in general policy development through their
representatives . The regulatory aspect of this relationship is,
accordingly, more pronounced" .(35)
The character of representation of the subordinate classes
is limited in scope in comparison to the branches which represent
the power bloc . Members of the latter are "authoritative
decision-makers" in the sphere of production and this is
reflected in the mandate of their representatives . In contrast,
the working class, including the surplus population of the
unemployed, occupies a subordinate position in the social
relations of production and this is also reflected in the mandate
of its representatives . However, the divisions in the subordinate
class which are established at the level of production relations
and reinforced
	
t the level of consumption are also reflected in
the differential role of their representatives .(36)
Understanding the Department Indian Affairs and Northern
Development
In Canada, the federal department which currently controls
and represents Indians is the Department of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development (DIAND) . Historically,
however,
responsibilty for the administration of Indians fell under an
array of departments . During the first half of the 19th century
(17)
(18)
the adminisration of Indian affairs shifted a number of times
between military and civilian authority . Then, in 1860
responsibility over Indian affairs was transferred from imperial
control to the Province of Canada . Following Confederation in
1867, responsibility for Indians was transferred to the federal
government . In 1867, the Indian Act (which set out the guidelines
for governance of Indians through the reserve system) was passed
and four years later the Department of Indian Affairs was
established . Although it was a separate department between 1880
and 1936, the Minister of the Interior resumed the position of
Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs . In 1936, the department
fell under the authority of the Department of Mines and Resources
where it remained until 1949 when it was transferred to the
Department of Citizenship and Immigration . I 1965, the Indian
Affairs Branch was merged with the Department of Northern Affairs
and Natural Resources until 1966 when a separate department was
created and it took on the present title, the Department of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development .(37)
The department's relation to Indian people has been greatly
influenced- by two factors . First, the terms of the Indian Act
have conditioned the relationship because it defines Indians as
colonial people who are incapable of self-development and
therefore dependent on the generosity of the colonial authority .
By defining Indians as such, this has reinforced their
integration to Canadian society as "marginals" . The second
(19)
factor i the department's "province-like authority" over the
north . Mahon has argued that the mandate of the Northern
Development Branch is to encourage large corporations to engage
in resource exploitation in northern regions and that this has
been dominant over the interests of Indian Affairs .(38) Thus, the
DIAND has the dual role of being responsible for the interests of
Indians and resource development . In commenting on this dual
nature of the DIAND, Satzewich and Wotherspoon state : " . . .there
are two distinct target groups stemming from the present
structure of DIAND: Indian people and large corporations
interested in the exploitation of northern resources . Since the
mid-1960s the department has forged relations of representation
and social control with Indian people and large resource
development multinationals ."(39)
The dual nature of the representation and social control
activities of the DIAND is reflected in the division of the
departmental programs into four areas : the Indian and Inuit
Affairs Program (IIAP) ; the Northern Affairs Program; the Canada
Oil and Gas Lands Administration ; and the Administration Program .
In particular, the first three programs demonstrate the split
between controlling and representing the interests of Indians and
resource development multinationals . More specifically, they
emphasize the contradictory nature between the DIAND's mandate to
represent and control its two target groups .
The mandate of the Indian and Inuit Affairs Program is to
(20)
"fulfill the government's obligations to Indians arising out of
treaties, the Indian Act, and other relevant legislation ;
deliver basic services to status Inians and Inuit communities ;
assist in employment and business development of Indian and Inuit
people ; negotiate
	
the transfer of decision making to the
community level ; and support constitutional discussions ."(40)
The Canadian Oil and . Gas Lands Administration and the
Northern Affairs Program deal primarily with northern resource
companies . The Northern Affairs program provides support for the
development of political, social, and cultural institutions in
the north and for the management and protection of the northern
environment . Also, its mandate is to provide 'direct funding and
coordination of economic initiatives by industry and other
federal governments ."(41) The mandate of the Canadian Oil and Gas
Lands is the 'regulation of oil and natural gas exploration and
development of Canada's frontier lands .'(42)
Also, the administration program provides "financial,
administrative, and management services to the department's
programs, human resource services to its employees, and
coordinates the communication of the department's activities to
aboriginal peoples and the general public ."(43)
Clearly, the DIAND's departmental programs indicate the
contradictory nature of its mandate to represent and control its
two target groups . As Satzewich and Wotherspoon argue, "there are
two orders of contradictions within the contempory structure of
necessary to
(21)
the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada . First,
there is a contradiction between the representation and control
of each of its client groups, and there is a contradiction
between servicing the concerns of each of these groups ."(44)
Also, in reflecting on the history of administration of-Indians,
they state :
Historically, the Indian and Inuit Affairs
Program, or what was once the Indian Affairs Branch,
has been more interested in the control of Indian
people rather than representation . Given that Indian
people had no access to the federal or provincial
franchise until after World War II, there was little
need to be politically concerned about representing
their interests . Since the acquisition of the franchise
and the subsequent politicization of Indian people both
nationally and locally in the 1960s, IIAP has become
more concerned with the representation of Indian
interests at the cabinet table . The dialectic of
representation and social control is now more
complicated than ever .(45)
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the link between migration, the
reserve a-rmy of labour concept and the capitalist state . In order
t
	
understand the reserve army of labour concept, it was
understand Marx's theory of labour . This entailed
pointing out that exploitation is the difference between the use
value of labour power and its exchange value . Because of the
competition in the market to sell commodities, capitalists must
lower their selling price to sell more commodities . In order to
(22)
lower the selling price of commodities, however, the
production must be lowered . One way of lowering the
production is by lowering the cost of labour . This is
investing in machinery which increases the value produced by
labour . With the increased use of machinery in production, there
is a reduction in the demand for labour . The pool of unemployed
workers that is created by the introduction of machines in
production forms what Marx referred to as the reserve army of
labour .
Because capitalism is uneven development within a national
economy and between national economies, in some areas there is a
decrease in the demand for labour while in other areas there is
an increase in the demand for labour . Migration of labour out of
the reserve army of labour occurs when workers move to areas
where labour shortages exist . Immigrants and migrants from the
reserve army of labour provide capital with an inexhaustible pool
of labour to draw upon at low wage rates . Moreover, these workers
are usually defined racially as inferior to the dominant group in
society . This enables capitalists to exploit immigrant and
migrant labour and thereby increase their rate of profit .
The capitalist state, as defined in the Marxist perspective,
is determined by the mode of production . A fundamental role of
the state is to create the conditions for capital accumulation .
This means that the state must maintain the relations of
exploitation between the working class and the capitalist class
cost of
cost of
done by
(23)
upon which accumulation is based . Thus, the state exercises its
power to the long-term benefit of the capitalist class .
It was also pointed out that there is unequal representation
between the institutions that make up the state . In particular,
it was noted that the Department of Finance constitutes the seat
of power among the institutions of the state . It represents the
interests of the dominant class in society and, because of its
position it is able to promote their development interests more
effectively than other institutions that represent the interests
of the subordinate classes . In fact, this unequal structure of
representation allows the state to organize the hegemony of_ the
ruling class in capitalist society .
The chapter also discussed the Department of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development
. A brief history of the department was
provided which demonstrated that Indian Affairs fell under the
authority of a number of other state departments until the late
1960s when it became a separate department This demonstrated
that Indians and Indian policy were considered marginal to other
state policies and therefore reflected the relative powerlessness
of Indian people . It has been argued that the DIAND mandate of
control-and representation of its two target groups, Indians and
resource development multinationals, are'contradictory . Moreover,
the history of the Indian Affairs Branch has been overwhelmingly
characterized by social control of Indians as opposed to
representation of their interests .
(24)
The intention of this thesis is not to measure the actual
rate of exploitation or the rate of capital accumulation in the
industry under study . The point of discussing concepts like
"exploitation" and "capital accumulation" is to clarify
theoretically their link between the state, migration and the
reserve army of labour .
The next chapter looks at how the Canadian state was in a
position to create a Native migrant labour force for the sugar
beet fields of southern Alberta . It provides a brief discussion
on the role that the state has played in the creation of migrant
labour forces in South Africa . Because there are many historical
similarities between the experiences of the indigenous people of
South Africa and that of Canadian Indians in regard to state
policies, the case of South Africa provides insights into how the
Canadian state positioned itself in order 'to induce and
facilitate the flow of Indians from reserves to southern
Alberta's sugar beet industry .
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Chapter Two : LabourMigrationanaltheState
To understand how the Canadian state was in a position to
facilitate and regulate the flow of Native labour to the sugar
beet industry in southern Alberta, it is useful to review other
instances of migrant labour . In particular, it is useful to
examine the role which the state has played in inducing the
migration of labour in South Africa . That is, because of the
historical parallels between the reserve system in South Africa
and Canada and given that in South Africa the state has been
widely recognized as having played a key role in inducing and
regulating labour migration from its reserves, much can be
understood by examining the case of South Africa and comparing it
to that of Canada .
The South African State and Labour Migration
Recent studies emphasize the role the state plays in
creating and reproducing the conditions for systems of migrant
labour .(1) Prior to recent changes, South Africa provided a good
example of a system of migrant labour created by the state . In
the past, a system of racial segregation, referred to as
apartheid, was instituted by the state in order to provide a
source of cheap labour for capitalist production .
In South Africa, the apartheid system originated within
(29)
settler colonialism and has its logic in the capitalist mode of
production . With the discovery of diamonds in the mid-nineteenth
century, and later gold, there was a great demand for a source of
cheap labour . The Europeans of South Africa fulfilled this demand
by subjugating the indigenous populations and transforming the
African rural economy in order to stimulate migration .(2)
At the time when the mines were opened in South Africa in
the late nineteenth century, the native traditional subsistence
economy was self-sufficient . Thus, to promote labour migration to
the mines, the state imposed constraints upon the native
subsistence economy . First, in 1885, a protectorate was
proclaimed for Bechuanaland . Then, in 1899 the state established
for the first time a hut tax . Consequently, it became necessary
for the native population to find a regular sum of money each
year . These measures coincided with the labour shortage in the
newly opened mines . Given the fact that the subsistence economy
provided a very limited source of income, it became necessary to
supplement it by seeking a paid occupation . Therefore, migration
to the mines emerged as the only alternative .(3)
The imposition of new costs to the traditional subsistence
economy through taxation was reinforced by the state's program of
expropriation of tribal lands . Land expropriation reduced the
ability of the subsistence economies to support their own
populations while
	
at the same time it increased the
attractiveness of migration because by working in the mines the
(30)
individual could not only support himself but also his family
through periodic remittances . Moreover, the state intervened to
ensure that the tribal economies did not deviate from increasing
the available labour supply . For instance, those Africans who
attempted to adapt to the new conditions through commercial
farming were promptly priced out of the market by subsidies for
the white farmers . Thus, it was arranged so that entering the
wage labour market was more rewarding than remaining in the rural
areas and accumulating surplus produce .(4)
Although labour migration was e-ncouraged, tribal economies .
were not to be eliminated . If they had been it would have meant
that the costs of social benefits and reproduction of the labour
force would have been absorbed by the capitalist sector .(5)
Thus, what emerged was the utilization of a precapitalist source
of wage labour whereby migration was promoted on the one hand,
and the autonomous capacity of the tribal economy to produce food
was preserved on the other, which enabled them to absorb workers
when they were no longer needed by the capitalist sector .
The system of racial segregation that evolved in South
Africa was'- entrenched in laws dating back to the turn of the
century. These laws were designed with two objects in mind : " to
preserve the white monopoly on political power and to provide a
r
reservior of cheap and coercive labour for industry and
agriculture ."(6) To achieve these objectives, the country has
been divided territorially . The Land Acts have designated about
13 percent of the country as "reserves" or "homelands" for the
African majority . However, these densely populated and
impoverished homelands were never intended to sustain the
majority of the population . Only by working outside these
reserves under a migrant_ labour system administrated by labour
bureaucrats which assign workers to specific industries or
employers could Africans . earn enough money to provide for
themselves and their families .(7) Moreover, through the reserves
the state
	
excluded . Africans from their political right to
vote . This was accomplished by passing an Act in 1894 which
stipulated that land allotment to individuals on reserves was - to
be held in communal tenure . Thus, blacks could not fulfill the
propriety conditions for the franchise .(8) Lastly, through
system of temporary contracts, in conjunction with a complex set
of internal passes and passports the
state regulated the flow of
black labour while it also ensured the return of workers to their
reserves . (9)
The Canadian State and Reserves as
Reserve Armies of Labour
In the latter part of the 1800's the fur trade declined and
Native people lost their importance in the staples economy
. And,
as the new Canadian state embarked upon the establishment of a
national economy based on agriculture and urban industry, they
were seen as obstacles in the path of capitalist development
. In
(32)
addition, the buffalo which were the main source of subsistence
for the Plains Indains of Western Canada, were almost depleted
causing various groups in the area to starve .(10) It was against
this background that the Canadian government forced the Indians
to sign treaties . In effect, the treaties gave the Canadian state
control of Indian lands while in return they were confined to
small tracts of land referred to as reserves .(11)
Through segregation
	
on reserves, the state (i .e . the
administrative arm of the state currently referred to as the
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) argued it
could protect Indians from the negative features of Euro-Canadian
society while it taught them the ways of the whiteman so that
eventually, they could enter into mainstream society and assume
full citizenship rights and obligations . To achieve these
objectives the state utilized the Indian Act of 1876, which,
sought to regulate virtually every aspect of Indian life .(12) To
ensure compliance to the Act, an Indian agent was placed on each
reserve to act as a local manager and Justice of the Peace .
The reserve system attempted to transform the indigenous
populations from their traditional lifestyle of hunting and
trapping to that of agricultural production and wage labour . This
was to be accomplished through various means . To undermine the
communal lifestyle of Indians as well as to encourage the
adoption of the European concept of private property, the state
introduced the "location ticket" . Essentually, the ticket gave an
individual control of forty acres
	
reserve land but, not
(33)
ownership . The individual then entered into a three year
probationary period during which he had to demonstrate that he
would utilize the land in a Euro-Canadian manner . If he
accomplished this, he was given the title to land and
enfranchised .(13)
In many instances however, the allocation of poor farm land
to Indian bands and the surrender f fertile reserve lands
worked against development . Also, with the influx of agrarian
settlers to Western Canada, Indian lands were in great demand .
Thus, in some cases Indians were persuaded to move from prime
land to less fertile reserves . In other cases where reserve
agriculture was succeeding, pressure was exerted upon Indian
farmers by the Indian Affairs Branch to sell farm land rather
than expand . Moreover, because - 'of financial restrictions within
the Indian Act, loan money for economic development for
Indians on reserves has always been difficult to obtain .(14)
Finally, the stipulation that Indian farmers had to have written
permission from the agent before they could buy or sell produce
and cattle also restricted agricultural development .(15)
Conclusion
The reserve system in Canada has many similarities to the
apartheid system which existed in South Africa until very
recently . The system of racial segregation, taxation and
expropriation of tribal lands forced indigenous people to migrate
to areas of employment in order to subsist . A complex pass system
was instituted to ensure that workers returned to their home
lands upon completion of their work period .
In Canada, the reserve system, which is governed by the
Indian Act, in effect segregated Indians from the modern
capitalist economy and placed them in a position of
marginality and dependency . In fact, the reserve system was
contradictory to the extent that reserves were initially
envisioned to be sites where Indian people were to be prepared
for the incorporation into capitalist social relations, but
instead they ened up isolating and marginalizing Indian people
from capitalism .
The marginality of Indians was accomplished by placing them
on reserves, many of which had poor farming potential ; by
surrender of fertile reserve land ; and by the economic and'
forced upon Indians through the Indian
Act . general, state policies transformed indigenous
populations on reserves into a pool of cheap labour upon which
capitalists can draw workers in times of need . In other words,
they form part of the reserve army of labour from which capital
can draw upon at low wage rates . And, because of the state's
control over Indians through the reserve policy and the Indian
Act it was in a position to facilitate and regulate the flow of
political restrictions
(34)
Indian workers from reserves to areas where there was a demand
for labour .
The next chapter examines the structure of the sugar beet
industry in southern Alberta . The focus is on the price farmers
received for their sugar beets and their costs of production .
will also point out the response of farmers and the state in
relation to these aspects of the sugar beet industry .
(35)
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Chapter Three : TheStructureoftheSugar BeetIndustryin
SouthernAlberta
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the structure of
southern Alberta's sugar beet industry . It looks at the prices
that farmers received for their sugar beet crops from the early
1950s to recent times . Also, it discusses various aspects that
impinged upon the cost of producing sugar beets . The response of
farmers and the state to problems experienced by low beet returns
and rising costs of production are-also examined . This discussion
on these aspects of the structure of the sugar beet industry
indicate that farmers had to pursue every means possible to lower
their costs of production in order to create enough profit to
stay in business .
Sugar Beet Country in Southern Alberta
Southern Alberta is one of the most diversified agricultural
regions in Canada . Sugar beet country extends from the town
Raymond north to Picture Butte and Iron Springs, and east to
of
the areas south of Bow Island and north of Vauxall
. A reasonably
accurate estimation of this area would be that it encompasses a
circle in southern Alberta which Is about 75 miles in diameter .
Within this area sugar beet growers are concentrated around
Taber, Vauxall, Bow Island, Picture Butte and Coaldale . Taber is
near the centre of sugar beet country and is 150 miles southeast
of Calgary . On the southwestern perimeter of this region and next
o the Blood Indian Reserve, there is the city of Lethbridge . It
is a prosperous place and offers most of the advantages of city
living and thus, it is the major shopping and entertainment
centre for sugar beet country . Southern Alberta is noted for its
long hot summer days and low annual levels of rainfall . It was
through the introduction of irrigation in the early 1900s that it
was possible to grow sugar beets as well as a variety of other
specialty crops in this area .
Southern Alberta's sugar beet industry can be characterized
as having three different classes . At the top there are the
owners of the British Columbia Sugar Refining Company Limited,
which, also owns the Alberta Sugar Company . B . C . Sugar holds a
monopoly in sugar production in Western Canada and the Company
controls the indispensible means of making and marketing the
finished product . Below the Company owners there are the beet
farmers or growers who sign contracts with B . C . Sugar to deliver
specified tonnage of beets at price stipulated by the
Company .-At the bottom there are the beet workers who sign
contracts=- with the growers to cultivate a specific acreage of
beets . (1)
(38)
The Early History of the Sugar Beet Industry in Southern Alberta
Association's inception, its
the watchdog
	
of the
(39)
The sugar beet industry in southern Alberta began in 1902
when a Latter Day Saint by the name of Jesse Knight from Provo,
Utah built a factory for processing beets into sugar near
Lethbridge . However, even with a twelve year tax exemption and
subsidies from the federal and provincial governments, the
Company was not a financial success .(2) As a result, in 1914 the
factory was shut down and it moved to the United States . Although
many reasons were cited for the closure of the factory, the main
reason was the shortage of available labour for beet work .(3) A
decade later, however, a group of- farmers convinced the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company to start up the industry again and so in 1925
sugar beet operations commenced once more in southern Alberta .
1925, southern Alberta farmers also established the
Alberta Cooperative Sugar Beet Growers' Association . Since the
" primary
welfare
growers ."(4) One of the primary
was the lack of sufficient
industry .(5) This -concern for
purpose . . . has been . . .to be
of the Alberta sugar beet
concerns of the new organization'
workers for the labour-Intensive
labour is evident throughout the
annual reports of the organization particularly following the
1950s when immigrant labour could not be procured . The
organization's name was changed in 1941 to the Alberta Sugar Beet
Growers Association (ASBGA) . During this period its policy was to
increase sugar production in order to meet the emergency of
threatened external supplies .(6) Also, it was at this time that
the industry used large numbers of interned Japanese and German
prisoners of war as labourers .(7) In 1983, the organization took
on its current name, the Alberta Sugar Beet Growers Marketing
Board (ASBGMB) .
In the early 1900s, the British Columbia Sugar Refining
Company was named E . T . Rogers' B . C . Sugar and, the Alberta
Sugar Company was known as the Canadian Sugar Factories Limited .
During the depression in the 1930s, Rogers took control of
Canadian Sugar Factories in Alberta which was a subsidiary of the
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company . Initially, Rogers intention was to shut
down the Alberta operation and thereby eliminate sugar beet
competition . However, one of the conditions that Utah-Idaho
insisted upon as part of the sale was that Rogers keep the
factory operating for ten years so that southern Alberta farmers
would have a place to sell their sugar beets . Since Rogers had a
monopoly in sugar production and was determined to make a profit
on its Alberta operation, it immediately reduced the price the
Company would pay for sugar beets . Consequently, in the first
year of production after the takeover in 1931, the Alberta
operation made a 20% profit .(8) And, because the Company had
lowered the price it paid for sugar beets, this forced the beet
farmer
	
pass the reduction on to the workers . Thompson and
Seager state :
(40)
Squeezed by Rogers Sugar the growers squeezed
(41)
the final link in the chain, the beet worker .
Between 1931 and 1934 the contract rate for beet
labour declined from $21 an acre to $17, despite
the fact that the productivity of each worker,
as measured by the number of tons of beets
produced on each acre, increased . The worker's
share of the farmer's return from the beet crop
was reduced from an average of 38 .6% in the 1925-30
period to 28 .3% between 1931 and 1934 . . . .(9)
Sugar Beet Prices and the World Sugar Market
In the early 1950s, southern Alberta farmers received low
prices for their sugar beets . In 1956, ASBGA President, Lalovee
Jensen states :
. . . in 1950 we received for beets a return of
$18 .45 per ton . Since that time prices have
fallen to disaster levels . A return . of the
$18 .00 beet would mean only that we had recovered
the ground lost since 1950 . When we consider the
great improvement in the national economy since
that time, it is quickly realized that our farm
people are justly entitled to a price per ton
of beets greatly in excess of $20 .00, if we are
to regain a position of equality with the rest of
the Canadian economy .(10)
fact,
	
throughout much of the history southern
Alberta
s
.sugar beet industry, farmers have received low returns
for their sugar beet crops . A main reason for the low returns was
the fact that the price paid for sugar beets in Canada was linked
to the price of sugar on the world market . That is, when there
was a world surplus of sugar, it was dumped on the world market
(42)
by sugar producing countries at very low prices . Canada dealt on
the international sugar market and thus its domestic price for
sugar was based on the low price of this market . Consequently,
Rogers had to sell sugar to Canada at this low price which meant
it had to pay a low price for its sugar beets . In order to
counter the depressing impact of the world sugar market on
Canadian produced sugar prices, the ASBGA, in conjunction with
the National body of Canadian Sugar Beet Growers, has repeatedly
pressed the federal government for a National Sugar Policy which
would protect the Canadian producers from the dumping of cheap
foreign sugar and at the same time encourage the growth of-the
Canadian sugar beet industry .(11)
The ASBGA did gain some measure of success in its quest for
an equitable National Sugar Policy as in 1959 "sugar beets [were]
named as one f the commodities under the terms of the
Agricultural Prices Stabilization Act ."(12) This meant that sugar
beet growers, but not processors, were guaranteed a specific
price per ton at a particular percentage of beet sugar content .
In other words, beet farmers were given a deficiency payment, or
subsidy when their returns fell below the price level set by the
federal government . For instance, in 1959 after the Sugar Policy
was implemented, the Alberta beets grown in 1958 were supported
at $15 .45 per ton on beets with a sugar content of 17% .(13) At
the time, ASBGA President, Lalovee Jensen, remarked : "This totals
$1,470,000, or an average of $950 .00 per contract . In dollars and
(43)
cents this represents the greatest single benefit ever to be
procured for you by any Alberta Sugar Beet Directorate in the
entire thirty-five years of the organization's history ."(14)
Following the implementation of the Sugar Policy, based on
the Agricultural Prices Stabilization Act, the ASBGA did not see
it as something to be relied upon as a permanent cure for its
problems and thus it sought a more satisfactory and effective
solution . Moreover, it was felt that what was given by the
federal government could be easily taken away . In particular, the
organization wanted the home market safeguarded from the impact
of world sugar prices, which, would foster a fair profit for the
growers' investment . At the annual convention of the ASBGA in
1960, President Lalovee Jensen stated :
You delegates have repeatedly instructed your
board to press for a [Nlational [Plolicy that
would bring stability -to an industry beset by
the dilemma of wildly fluctuating world sugar
prices which set the levels of our own markets
and over which we have no control . When it is
realized that these world price levels are in
themselves built upon the premise of cheap
(Niative labour and the dumping of a very minor
part of the world's production of sugar into any
market that will take it, it is readily seen that
there is an urgent need for such a [Nlational
[Plolicy . Canadian markets must be made healthy
markets for Canadian Beet Sugar . The well being
of these southern irrigated farms, the city of
Lethbridge and the towns around it are predicated
on a healthy sugar industry, and I mean by that
a sugar industry in which both the grower and the
processor can find a measure of profit sufficient
to meet the needs of their efforts .(15)
In order to address the problems created by the world sugar
market, the
	
ASBGA has periodically negotiated International
Sugar Policies . For example, in 1969 the ASBGA negotiated a new
International Sugar Agreement with exporting and importing
nations . Under the terms of the agreement target price levels
were set up for a floor level of $3 .25 and a top level of $5 .25
per hundred for sugar at the point of export .(16) Various methods
were set up to ensure that the price of sugar would fall between
the two levels . In the view of the ASBGA, the advantages of the
agreement were that prices would tend to be higher on the world
market which, in turn, would create higher prices in Canadaa and
thus sugar manufacturers in the home market would have larger
margins to recover their costs and to show a profit . And, with a
higher price for sugar manufacturers, the growers, in turn, would
receive a higher price for sugar beets which meant smaller
deficiency payments from the Stabilization Board .(17)
A year after the International Sugar Agreement was
implemented, there was skepticism concerning its usefulness in
terms of raising sugar prices . In 1969, while commenting on the
Agreement,_ President of the ASBGA, Lalovee Jensen, stated :
This [Algreement has not proven to be a perfect
vehicle on which to base our hope for a new
level of world sugar prices that will be
sufficient to support the sugar beet industry .
In the short year that it has been in operation,
it has not proven to be effective enough as yet
to maintain the price level above the bottom
target of $3 .25 . Canadian sugar beet producers
(44)
Sugar Agreement . 11 (19) As a
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will need to continue to have additional assistance
by way of the Agricultural Prices Stabilization
Act in order to maintain production and remain
competitive .(18)
In the early 1970s, however, prices of sugar on the world
market increased . In 1972, for instance, "world prices tended to
be above the levels
	
f control provided by the International
result of the price increase of the
world market, the price levels of Canadian sugar sales increased .
Consequently, these abnormal world sugar prices caused growers to
gain a higher return for their sugar beets and thus -:the
deficiency payment program under the Stabilization Act was not
needed .(20) In subsequent years, the trend of high returns for
beet growers continued . In fact, in 1974, the ASBGA President,
Lalovee Jensen , remarked : "The fiftieth year of sugar beet
production has proven to b a great .year for all of us . The
return for last year's beets of $47 .10 per ton is the highest on
record and it is fitting that it was achieved in our fiftieth
year ."(21)
In the early 1980s, sugar prices began to decrease . In 1982,
it was reported that "Alberta sugar prices tumbled fifty percent
within a two year period ."(22) During this period, world sugar
producing countries had good crops which created a surplus of
production as compared to consumption .(23) To combat the drop in
world sugar prices, the ASBGA again called for a National Sugar
Policy and requested that an International Sugar Agreement be
(46)
implemented which would reduce surplus production . n 1983, John
Vaselenak, the ASBGMB President, stated :
Sugar prices have dropped to half of our 1979
price . High sugar inventories and the use of
other sweeteners indicate that sugar prices
will remain low for some time . A workable
International Sugar Agreement which would reduce
sugar inventories fairly among exporting nations,
appears to be the only solution . Sugar sold on the
world market at prices below the cost of production
in its country of origin, is of no benefit to the
producing nation . We growers hope that a new
International Sugar Agreement among exporting
nations soon can be reached . One that will reduce
surplus stocks and allow -prices to increase to
levels at which we can receive a just price for our
sugar from the market place . In Canada, until we have
success in persuading our politicians and consumers
that a Sugar Policy is advantageous, we must use the
price protection we have under the National
Agricultural Products Stabilization Act .(24)
In 1985, the problems of sugar beet farmers mounted as it
was "the first time in 60 years of consecutive sugar beet
production in southern Alberta that the sugar beet farmer did not
produce sugar beets for processing ."(25) The lack of production
stemmed from the Board's inability to negotiate a contract with
B .C . Sugar . Negotiations for contract in 1985 broke down
because B ..C . Sugar demanded "a greater share of the pie from the
grower" or else "beet refining operations on the prairies would
be closed."(26) The problem for B .C . Sugar was that it too felt
the effects of low market prices and therefore it had to squeeze
the grower for more profit . From the view point of B .C
. Sugar, a
reduced price for sugar beets simply meant that farmers would
receive a higher deficiency payment . In the view of the ASBGMB,
however, this was a misuse of the intent of the Stabilization Act
and what needed to be implemented was a National Sugar Policy .
Paul Thibodeau, Vice-President of the ASBGMB, summarized the
problem as follows :
The Agricultural Stabilization Act is designed
to support the grower but not the refiner .
This is causing serious problems to the growers .
As the refiner's profit margin narrows, increased
pressure by the refiner is put on growers to change
the contract . The argument they use is that any money
not received from the sale of our product will be
made up by increased government payment .
The stabilization plan was never intended to be
used in that manner . Since 1958, 15 years out of 24 a
deficiency payment has been paid to the growers . The
fact that growers have had to be supported by the
government in so many years should indicate to us
that our industry has had some serious problems . The
obvious conclusion then is that raw sugar prices in
Canada have been much too low in those 15 years . The
beet refiner is also claiming to be running at a
very low profit margin in those years and there is no
reason for us to doubt that statement . There is another
method that would allow growers and refiners to move
ahead in a positive and assured manner . This method
is to have a floor price on raw sugar entering Canada-
what is called a sugar policy and what growers have
been asking for years now .(27)
In the spring of 1986, news headlines in sugar beet country
read : "THE BEETS ARE BACK"
.(28) At this time, the uncertainty and
anxiety that beet farmers were experiencing in not knowing if
there would be a beet crop for Alberta was
put to rest when the
(47)
(48)
federal government came to the rescue and established a domestic
sugar beet policy designed to maintain the Canadian sugar beet
industry . Central to the policy was a cost-sharing stabilization
program for sugar beets . For the 1986 crop year, the federal
government and growers were to negotiate and share the cost of
the stabilization program . In the following years however, the
stabilization program was to be negotiated and the cost shared by
the beet growers, the provincial governments of Alberta, Manitoba
and Quebec, and the federal government .(29) These voluntary cost-
sharing programs were guaranteed payments to sugar beet growers
at a support level set over a longer period of time than previous
stabilization programs . To go along with the stabilization plan,
the federal government committed itself to seeking an
International Sugar Agreement which would promote fair
competition and a stable world market . Also, to encourage growers
to seed a crop in 1986, the federal government provided a
"planting incentive" to be paid to growers based on individual
1982, 1983, 1984, and 1986, production levels . This payment
amounted to approximately $5 .6 million for Alberta growers .(30)
Lastly, the government's policy gave beet growers more direct
access to the U . S . sugar import quotas . Beginning in 1987, the
quotas were given to the Canadian Sugar Beet Growers . Returns
from the export sugar went to the Canadian Sugar Producers'
Association, which, then paid the beet growers on the basis of
the total number of beets delivered for export .(31) With the
(49)
backing of the federal government's sugar policy, the ASBGMB
negotiated a three year agreement with Alberta Sugar Company .
This was the first time in the history of Alberta's sugar beet
industry that an agreement was signed for more than one year .(32)
On April 16, 1987, the ASBGMB and government officials
signed the National Tripartite Stabilization Program for Sugar
Beets (NTSP) . In commenting on the policy ASBGMB President,
Walter Boras, stated : "The tripartite solution for sugar beet
production was not our way of solving the problems of marketing,
but we take it with satisfaction that it will and can sustain us
for the immediate years ahead ."(33)
In the years following the implementation of the National
Tripartite Stabilization Program, it was plagued with problems .
In 1986 when the federal government announced its position in
relation to the sugar beet industry, it related to three points .
These included : 1 . that a tripartite stabilization plan would be
implemented beginning with the 1987 crop; 2 . that Canada would'
seek an International Sugar Agreement to promote fair competition
and a stable world market ; and, 3 . to compliment the
stabilization program, beet growers would be given direct access
to the exports of refined sugar to United States . These three
points were to form the basis of "Canada's Sugar Policy" and the
survival of the beet industry was contingent on success in all
three areas . In relation to the third point, however, problems
arose due to interdepartmental confusion within the federal
(50)
government with their approach taken for disbursements of the
earnings from the U . S . Sugar Import Quota . Consequently, this
program became a net cost to the NTSP instead of the compliment
that it was suppose to produce . In relation to the second point,
Canada had done some work on an International Sugar Agreement but
for the most part it seemed to lack serious commitment to this
task . Lastly, in relation to the first point, a ten year NTSP was
implemented for the 1987 production year to stabilize the price
of sugar beets in order to assist the industry to realize fair
returns for its labour and investment . The NTSP for sugar beets
was designed to be actuarially sound over time . However, it was
an accepted fact that unless success was achieved on the second
and third points, then the NTSP could not absorb the liability of
world sugar trade fluctuations . These fluctuations resulted when
exporting countries dumped sugar on the world market during
periods of low prices . And, because Canada purchased sugar on the
world market during these periods, this in turn lowered the
domestic price paid for sugar .(34) As a result of the problems,
"(alfter just two years of operation the NTSP had an accumulated
deficit in excess of $13 .5 million" .(35)
In the early 1990s, the problems of the NTSP continued to be
a major issue facing the sugar beet industry . In 1992, ASBGMB
President, Brian Anderson, summarized the situation as follows :
Canada is a trading nation . The Canadian
economy is extremely dependant on trade
. What the
(51)
beet industry needs is fair trade rules . Through a
technicality in the definition of standing within
Canada's trade legislation, dumped and subsidized
sugar is allowed to enter this country with the
producer's hands tied . This places our industry in
a unique position as compared to other commodities,
therefore we need unique considerations in the
development of our future direction . We must continue
to pursue both long and short term solutions to our
problems . We must be careful that the short term
solutions do not interfere with the long term
viability of the industry . As the current NTSP has
failed to meet the measure of its creation we must
now develop a new program that is equitable, cost
effective, and financially responsive ; a program
that would encourage a high degree of participation
of all producers and reduce the need for ad hoc
programs . (36)
Clearly, throughout the history of the sugar beet industry
the prices set by the world sugar market have adversely affected
the prices that southern Alberta's sugar beet farmers received
for their crops . To the present the ASBGMB is still attempting to
negotiate a "Canadian Sugar Policy" that will promote a healthy
sugar beet industry in southern Alberta and provide both the
grower and the processer with a fair measure of profit sufficient
to cover the needs of their efforts .
Costs of Production in Alberta's Sugar Beet Industry
Another factor that affected the rate of profit for sugar
beet farmers were the costs of production . Beginning in the late
1950s, sugar beet growers as well as the general agricultural
community in Alberta began to feel the pressure of low market
(52)
prices
for
farm products and a loss of Profit from high
production costs . ASBGA President, Lalovee Jensen, stated :
The general farm picture continues to be
clouded by uncertainties as to commodities
prices and the production difficulties which
follow . In 1959 price levels of many farm products
were very close to depression year levels . . . .Not
since 1947 have sugar prices been so depressed . . . .
There are two primary reasons for these unfortunate
conditions facing our basic industry . First : The cash
returns to agricultural producers for their products
are in general quite definitely too low . Many of them
near depression levels . Second : The goods and services
supplied by urban people and required in farm
production are at an all-time record high	Thus we
find that in spite of having made the greatest gains in
efficiency of any major industry, with a fifty per :cent
increase in production per man hour, over the last ten
years, most of our farm operators are in financial
difficulty .(37)
In 1961, Jensen pointed out that production . costs were
increasing because the "cost of taxes, land, machinery, labour
and supplies are at an all time high ."(38) The increase of
machinery costs prompted the ASBGA In 1967 to support the Alberta
Federation of Agriculture's efforts to have the Alberta
government deal with this matter . ASBGA Vice-President, Burns
Wood, stated : "A letter of concern over rising machinery costs
was forwarded to the Alberta government . Our support was given to
the A . F . A
.'s submission to the commission that was set up to
investigate this crippling aspect of our industry
." (39)
In the relatively few years when farmers did receive high
(53)
prices for their beet crops, the rate of profit was reduced as a
result of costs of production . For instance, in 1975 when the
return for sugar beets was high ASBGA Vice-President, Burns Wood,
stated "that the so-called high return on sugar beets per ton
does not always reflect a corresponding high net income for the
grower . Costs of input, especially labour, fertilizer,
herbicides, machinery and machinery parts are negating to a great
extent the hopes for higher net income ."(40) In 1976, Wood
pointed out that it was the lack of control in the two vital
areas of costs of production and
	
price return on sugar beets
which directly effected the beet farmer's margin of profit . He
stated :
As farmers we have little or no control over the
cost of vital and basic inputs . . We have
no power
over holding the cost of production down . We are
victims of ever increasing costs of fuel, labour,
machinery, parts, services, taxes, herbicides,
fertilizer and endless other inputs . For most of our
products and especially sugar we have equally little or
no control over the prices we receive . Because of these
facts, farmers always take the initial brunt of
inflation . Because of inflated land values and
production inputs, the farming industry has been forced
to build in a higher cost base into production
. Without
high enough returns to cover this cost base, many
farmers will go out of business, and indeed, many farms
now are in financial trouble .(41)
As the decade of the 1970s ended, the forecast for any
relief from the escalating costs of production for beet farmers
in the 1980s was not positive . Wood stated :
(54)
It 1s difficult to look into the 1980's with
optimism . Fertilizer prices up thirteen percent in
1980, pesticides up eleven percent, new farm
machinery up ten to fifteen percent, farm wages up
seven percent, energy costs will rise higher than
the seven percent increase in 1979, farm credit will
surely go up, to name a few of our inputs . It will be
in 1980 that many farmers will feel the full force
of inflation .(42)
As predicted by Wood, the early 1980s were not profitable
for Alberta's sugar beet farmers . In 1982 it was reported that
Alberta sugar prices dropped by fifty per cent within a two year
period while production costs increased by thirty per cent during
the same span .(43) At this time the ASBGA in cooperation with the
Provincial Agricultural Economics Branch began monitoring the
production costs of beets . These costs were then used to calulate
the support level provided to beet farmers under the Federal
Agricultural Stabilization Act .(44) At the closing of the 1980s
ASBGMB President, Paul Thibodeau summed up the decade as follows :
The 80's started well . Because of the high world
sugar prices Alberta sugar beet growers recorded
the second highest payment for their crop in 1980 .
Although we did not know it then, those prices
would be'short lived . The price of dumped world
sugar declined very quickly and this meant declining
income for growers . Along with this came high prices,
high interests rates, no stabilization payments,
farm foreclosures, bankruptcies, extremely difficult
harvests, one year no sugar beet production, a drastic
change in grower contract and the gloomy forecast
.presented by Auditor General Mr . Kenneth Dye for the
future of the sugar beet industry . The list of bad
memories seems to go on and on . Along with all of that,
(55)
Free Trade, G .A .T .T . negotiations, safety nets, and the
G .S .T . are all subjects that have been piled on us .(45)
Another factor that was beyond the control of sugar beet
farmers which increased the costs of production and reduced the
margin of profit was the weather . For instance, in 1957 ASBGA
President Lalovee Jensen stated :
It is history now that there then ensued the
most difficult conditions ever experienced by
our growers . With over four-fifths of the crop
yet to be taken from the ground, wet and cold,
mud and snow, brought about conditions that
made it seem to many, a virtual certainty that
Alberta's sugar beet crop would never be harvested .
Some of our friends from Manitoba said to us, "Why
not leave them in the ground for the cost of
harvest will never be met by the returns from the
beets?"(46)
Also, during some years the summer was so hot and
dry that
the crops needed extensive irrigation . In 1970, for example, the
sugar beet fields had t -o be irrigated as many as six and seven
times . In early October off the same year, heavy frosts caused
extensive damage to the sugar beet crops .(47) So pervasive was
the threat of early frost that it was referred to as "The Plight
of the Sugar Beet Growers" .(48) Lastly, hail frequently caused
damage which forced the grower to increase crop damage insurance .
Eventually, the consistant threat of weather caused growers in
1984 request an "all-risk insurance plan" for sugar beets
.
Consequently, the ASBGMB invited a member of the Alberta Hail and
crop
(56)
Insurance Corporation to its annual meeting to
explain its
plan and answer questions .(49)
	
Thereafter, all risk crop
insurance was made available to Alberta beet
growers .
The Increase of Production in the Sugar Beet Industry
Two of the ways in which beet farmers were able to survive
the negative effects of low returns for sugar beets and rising
costs of production were to increase the yield per acre of sugar
beets and the beet sugar content In 1961 ASBGA Board Director,
Murray Holt, stated :
It might be of interest to know what has
been achieved in beet production, as a result of
technological research the past 15 years . With an
increase of only 17% in harvested acres, a yield
increase of 52% in total tons of beets has been
produced .
The yield of tons per acre increased 30% .
Sugar production increased even more than beet
production . An increase of 58% total sugar took
place from an increase of only 17% in number of
acres harvested . In 1946 an acre yielded 1 .92
tons of sugar, while in 1960 the average acre
yielded 2 .58 tons of sugar, an increase of 34% in
15 years . These are the results of combined efforts
in agriculture, chemistry and factory operations
making the best use of technological research .(50)
In 1970, ASBGA Chairman, John Vaselenak, pointed out that
two decades of changes in beet production had resulted in the
increase of the sugar content in the beet
. That is, beet growing
areas were expanded and a greater variation of soils were
employed ; greater amounts of a combination of nitrogen and
phosphates fertilizers were used ; the beet population per acre
was changed with mechanical thinners from 10 to 12 inches in row
stands to 4 to 6 inches which effected the size of beet produced ;
and, sprinkler irrigation systems were introduced which made it
possible to irrigate almost up to the day of harvest .(51)
As a result of the innovations in beet production, the trend
of increasing the tons per acre of sugar beets and the beet sugar
content continued . For instance, ASBGA Chairman, John Vaselenak,
reported that in "1971 new high beet producing records - were
established in Southern Alberta . Growers harvested 684,293 tons
of beets from 42,045 acres, for an average of 16 .27 tons per
acre . This is 2 .25 tons above the 10 year average ."(52)
And, in 1987 ASBGMB Chairman, Brian Anderson, reported :
The beet growers certainly did their part this
year toward improving total output, thus leading to
greater efficiency . We delivered 564,814 tonnes of
beets from 29,169 . acres with a yield of 19 .36
tonnes/acre . Another plus to this senerio is that
beet quality is very high, and for the first time
since 1977, we are anticipating an extraction of
sugar well above what is required to make a
standard tonne (125kg/tonne) .(53)
The Increase of Mechanization and Weed Control in the Sugar Beet
Industry and Its Effects
(57)
(58)
Two other ways that beet farmers were able to reduce their
costs of production were to increase mechanization and introduce
chemical weed control . In particular, these two changes in the
sugar beet industry reduced the amount of labour required to
produce sugar beets which, in turn, lowered the farmer's costs of
production .
In 1946 ASBGA Field Superintendent, Ernest Bennion, pointed
out that sugar beet "authorities . . .maintain 'we can raise our
sugar beet crops mechanically with less than one-half the labour
and one-half the cost ."'(54) Thus,_ it is during this period that
the industry moved towards reducing hand labour and increasing
mechanization . The three part plan aimed at full mechanization
included : the increased use of single germ seed or monogerm seed ;
the development of mechanical thinning of beets ; and, the
harvesting of sugar beets with machinery .(55) In regards to the
latter point, mechanical harvesters such as the Marbeet, John
Deere, International and Kiest, were being steadily introduced to
southern Alberta beet farmers in the mid-1940s . For' instance,
Bennion pointed out that in 1946, a "John Deere owned by H . A.
Jones, Picture Butte, and operated by Albert Posterski, harvested
30 acres in 62 hours, 3 acres of which was after the storm,
harvesting as high as 70 tons in one day ."(56)
By the end of 1963, mechanical harvesters had almost taken
over the harvesting of sugar beets .(57) Then, in 1965
.ASBGA
Chairman, John Vaselenak, stated :
Your Agriculture Committee have adopted as
their motto for the next few years, "Sugar Beet
Survival Through Mechanization ." Our foremost aim
will be to promote and encourage chemical weed
control and mechanical thinning . We feel that it is
most essential for all sugar beet growers to change
to monogerm seed, herbicide weed control and
mechanized thinning if they are to make a success
in growing sugar beets . . . . We firmly believe that with
. . . control of weeds, and through the use of mechanical
thinners that we should be able to reduce our labour
requirements and enable what labour we do have to do
more acreage .(58)
As a result of the efforts of the Agriculture Committee,
a few years later Vaselenak reported the following
1967 should be marked by this generation and
future generations as the year when monogerm seed
was accepted almost 100 per cent . The breeding of
monogerm seed, no doubt, is the-most significant
change that has ever taken place in the beet
industry . It is very unlikely that any greater
change than this will occur in beet production in
our life time . Without monogerm seed, mechanical
thinning would be impractical and herbicide weed
control only partially successful . Monogerm seed
is the key to low labour cost beet production .(59)
Vaselenak reported that in 1970 "growers incorporated with
herbicide--=21,008 acres of the 38,075 acres planted
."(60) Also,
during this year •8 thinners were used on 1,222 acres or 3
.3% of
the total 36,733 acres thinned .(61) By the end of 1972, growers
had used a herbicide on 30,165 acres of the 44,969 acres
planted .(62) And, in the same year 27 thinners were used on 4,306
acres or 10% of the total acres thinned .(63) The most popular
(59)
(60)
herbicides used at this time were the pre-plant chemicals such as
Roneet, Avadex, Tillam Herbicide 283 as well as combinations of
these chemicals .
During the 1970s beet growers became more dependent each
year on herbicide weed control and mechanization which in turn
lowered the costs of production . For example, in 1974 Vaselenak
stated :
The two trends of reducing labour costs in
beet production that are gaining recognition
among farmers are (a) seedings two to three
inches apart followed by electronic thinner and
(b) planting to stand at 5 to 6 inch spacing .
Both methods to be successful must be accompanied
by good seed bed preparation, herbicide weed
control and adequate supply of moisture . Last
year we had some 32 electronic thinners thin
4,300 acres or 12% of the crop . Some 1,400 acres
were planted to stand . In both operations labour
costs are reduced by 50% or more . Both of these
trends are expected to increase in the future .(64)
Indicative of the accumulative effect of mechanization,
herbicides and space planting in sugar beet production was the
decrease in the size of the labour force . For instance, in 1982
ASBGA Labour Committee Chairman, Jim Csabay, stated :
The work load of your Labour Committee
continues to decline year after year . The reason
being, the increased usuage of herbicides and
space planting, as pointed out in the agriculture
report . These practices decrease the number of
people required in our industry ; yearly less and
less labour is being used on our farms .(65)
Conclusion
In summary, it is clear that during much of
the history of
the southern Alberta's sugar beet industry beet farmers were
forced to accept the low prices they were offered for their
crops . In fact, they were price takers because the domestic price
of sugar was based on the low price of sugar on the world market .
It is evident throughout the annual reports that the ASBGA has
consistently sought
	
pressure the federal government
implement a National Sugar Policy aimed at producing a fair
return for sugar beets while at the same time encouraging growth
in the industry . Today, the ASBGMB is still actively pursuing
such a policy .
Besides receiving low returns for their beets, farmers were
also plagued by spiralling increases in the costs of production .
In particular, the cost of machinery, fertilizer and herbicides
increased dramatically- which adversely effected the profit margin
of farmers
. Similar to the price received for sugar beets,
farmers had no control over the increasing costs of production
.
In response, farmers turned to technological research to increase
the yield per acre of sugar beets and the beet sugar content,
thereby increasing their profit .
well, they increased
mechanization and chemical weed control In order to reduce the
amount of hand labour needed . The only area where farmers had a
great deal of control was in the area of hired contract labour .
(61)
played in the recruitment, movement and retention of Natives
southern Alberta's sugar beet industry . This will include a
discussion of the role that the Department of Indian Affairs
played in relation to the recruitment and retention of Native
migrant workers for southern Alberta's sugar beet fields . The
chapter will begin by discussing the background that set the
stage for the advent of the Native migrant labour force in the
sugar beet industry . In doing so, the way in which the state
intervened in the economy of southern Alberta's sugar beet
industry becomes evident .
(62)
AL5
will
be pointed out in chapter five, labour in the sugar beet
industry was very vunerable to exploitation and thus this was a
means through which farmers could lower their costs of production
and in turn, increase the margin of profit .
The next chapter will discuss the role that the state has
for
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Chapter Four : The StateandNativeMiqrantLabourinSouthern
Alberta's SuqarBeetIndustry
The question of how Indian and Metis people of northern
Alberta and Saskatchewan got started in sugar beet work in
southern Alberta is an interesting one given the fact that over
the years the sugar beet industry had actively sought a variety
of other ethnic groups to perform its labour . In analyzing how
Natives came to be in this position, one is struck by the
numerous ways in which the Canadian state intervened in-the
economy of the sugar beet industry in order to recruit, relocate
and retain the Native work force . The purpose of this chapter is
to analyze how a group of Native people, who in some cases lived
over 1,000 kilometers away from the sugar beet fields of southern
Alberta, and who historically had been excluded from various
forms of wage labour, came to be involved in a migrant labour
system .
The History of the Native Work Force in the Southern Alberta
Sugar Beet Industry
In the early 1900s most of the hand labour in the sugar beet
fields was done by immigrants from Central Europe
. This supply of
Immigrant labour lasted up until the Second World
War . At this
time a serious shortage of labour occurred
. However, the lack of
(67)
available labour was offset by acquiring Japanese workers from
internment camps and German prisoners of war to hoe, weed and
harvest the crops .(1)
n late 1946 the first group of Polish veterans came to the
sugar beet industry . And, in 1947 another contingent of Polish
veterans arrived numbering just over 500 and thus they augmented
the labour force . In general, following the Second World War
immigrant labour of all European nationalities supplied the
labour necessary for beet cultivation .(2)
By 1953 the movement of unskilled immigrants to Canada
dwindled and as a result sugar beet farmers experienced a labour
shortage . It was at this time that the industry turned to
employing a Native migrant labour force to do the work formerly
done by immigrant labour . In 1964, the annual report of the
Alberta Sugar Beet Growers' Association (ASBGA) recounted the
early history of Indian involvement in southern Alberta's sugar
beet industry . The report stated :
. . . by 1953 the movement of immigrants into Canada
had dwindled to such an extent that it was
questionable that sufficient labour would be
available to carry out the work required on
sugar beets .
It was at this time during discussions with
the Beet Growers' Association and the Canadian Sugar
factories, that Mr . James Lynn, Manager of the
National Employment Service, suggested we go to the
Indian reservations and find the necessary workers .
. . .Before the regular recruiting team commenced
. . .
Mr . L . R . Jensen, President of the Alberta Sugar Beet
Growers' Association, and Mr . James Lynn, . .
.visited and
spoke to the chiefs of the council at both the Blood
Reservation at Cardston and the Peigan Reserve at
Brocket . However, little result was obtained from
their visit .
The results of the recruiting team's efforts,
that consisted of Keith Pilling, Agricultural
Superintendent at Picture Butte, and James Lynn,
. . .was that approximately 120 Indian workers were
brought in . Some difficulty was experienced in getting
them placed, but eventually all of them found
employment . (3)
In the following year, Keith Pilling, Agricultural
Superintendent at Picture Butte, -and James Lynn, Manager of the
National Employment Service, widened their recruitment sphere .
They visited "all reservations between Lethbridge and Edmonton,
Edmonton to Lac La Biche and across country to High Prairie . From
there they returned to Edmonton and thence to North Battleford
and Meadow Lake Agencies in Saskatchewan ."(4) After the success of
these initial trips, various recruitment teams consisting of the
Agricultural Superintendent of Taber, the Employment supervisor
at Lethbridge, members of the ASBGA and individuals from the
Prairie Regional Office of the National Employment Service
(N .E .S .) canvassed all reservations in Alberta and Saskatchewan
and were successful in procuring enough Indian labour to meet the
needs of the sugar beet industry. The recruitment teams were used
up until 1958 when they were discontinued and the N .E .S . took
over the recruitment of labour . In 1958 ASBGA Director, Leith
Johnson, stated :
(68)
Indian labour accounted for the thinning,
hoeing and weeding on about 6400 acres---17 per
cent of the 1958 crop . Quality of Indian work
and grower acceptance of this labour is improving
each year, as the following figures will show .
In 1954 Indians cared for 654 acres . In 1955, 1243
acres . In 1956, 2658 acres . In 1957, 3359 acres .
In 1958 6400 acres, nearly ten times the 1954
output . About 1000 workers were brought forward in
the sponsored movement and an estimated 300
workers came on their own initiative or by private
arrangements with growers .(5)
At this time Johnson also pointed out that it was "generally
conceded that there will be no pool of labour to draw from, other
than the Indians ."(6)
The sugar beet industry had little choice but to tap the
pools of labour being unused on reserves in Alberta and
Saskatchewan because it was difficult to acquire both local and
immigrant labour . The latter fact was made clear to Alberta beet
growers in 1956 when ASBGA Director, W . B . Grunewald, was sent to
Europe to investigate the reasons why immigrants were not moving
to Canada to seek employment . Grunewald summarized the situation
in Europe at the time as follows :
Why all this dirth of agricultural workers?
Why all this lack of interest on the part of
Europe's potential sugar beet workers? We used
to get lots of labourers from Europe . Oh yes,
but that was in the Immediate post-war years,
displaced persons coming from refugee camps,
people who had fled a war-torn Europe . People
who had lost their homes, their relatives and
friends in many cases . They were people who had
nothing more to lose and all to gain . They eagerly
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responded when offered new homes and jobs in our
beet fields and they, so long as they lasted,
filled our needs . But those days are over .
In Europe I found economic conditions so
greatly improved that it was hard to believe . I
found factories humming on every hand, their
managements, especially in Holland, Belgium and
Germany, crying to the government for more workers
Employers of Dutch and German labourers were
berating their governments for even allowing,
let alone encouraging a program of emigration .(7)
With the increased importance in the movement of Natives to
the sugar beet fields of southern Alberta, It was decided in 1959
that the various local offices of the N . E . S . closest to the
reserves would handle the recruitment of Indian workers .(8)
Consequently, recruitment of Indian labour from reserves
increased . For instance, ASBGA Director, Leith Johnson stated :
"During the 1962 beet season, 551 growers used 2100 Indian
workers, who accounted for 40% of the thinning on a total of
16,103 acres . . . .This shows our growing dependence upon Indian
labour . They earned an estimated $400,000 .00 in beets . . . ."(9)
The pool of workers recruited from northern Alberta and
Saskatchewan by the N . E . S . was referred to as the "sponsored
movement" because it was the Federal-Provincial Farm Labour
Committee
	
that supplied the funds for the recruitment
program .(.10) However, once workers gained experience in the beet
fields many returned annually on their own . Workers that returned
by their own means were not registered with the N . E . S . and
therefore this group was referred to as "freelance" workers or
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"freelancers" . In 1964 the number of sponsored workers totalled
2,077 and it was estimated that 450-500 freelance workers were
also used to do the necessary beet work .(11)
It was reported that at the peak of the 1965 sugar beet
season "over three thousand Indians were employed---a figure
considerably over any previous year ."(12) And, in 1969 ASBGA
Chairman, Walter Strom, reported that "(t)he number of workers
who come on their own is increasing year by year . In 1969 we had
about 2000 Indian workers, and- f these half came on their
own ."(13)
By 1969 the majority of Native migrant labourers coming to
the sugar beet fields f Southern Alberta were from northern
Saskatchewan . A study done in 1969 revealed :
The area from which the heaviest concentration
of seasonal workers come appears to be northern
Saskatchewan--particularly Witchekan Lake Reserve,
Pelican Lake Reserve and Big River Reserve . There
seems to be a good number also from One
Arrow's,
The Montreal Lake Reserve, La Ronge, Stanley Mission,
Sandy Bay, Pelican Narrows, Thunderchild Reserve,
Loon Lake, The Raymore-Punnichy-area, Wadena, Kamsack,
and the Battleford Agency .
Mr .-Arnold Ahenakew of the Canada Manpower Centre
in Prince Albert estimates the following percentages of
these various populations become part of the seasonal
labour movement : Witchekan Lake Reserve 95%
. .
Pelican Lake Reserve 90% . . .Big River Reserve 65%
. . .
Montreal Lake Reserve 25% . . .One Arrow Reserve 25%
. . .
There are smaller numbers from other reserves .(14)
The study goes on to point out :
There are many Treaty Indians from northern
Alberta (with quite a number from the St . Paul area)
who come as workers . There are Metis from Saskatchewan
and Alberta and some "white" families also .(15)
During this period Native labour was so prevalent in the
sugar beet industry that in 1971 the ASBGA Chairman, Walter
Strom, remarked : "After nearly twenty years of using large
numbers of LNlative workers from northern Alberta and northern
Saskatchewan, we are still the largest users of (Nlative workers
in Canada ."(16) Strom also pointed out that in 1971 the number of
Native workers in the sugar beet fields totalled 2000 . Of this
total 800 came with the sponsored movement and the other 1200
were freelance workers .(17) Most of these freelance workers were
originally part of the organized movement . Moreover, the numbers
of freelance workers increased in coming years . For instance, In
the annual ASBGA report in 1974 Chairman, Walter Strom, reported
that of the 2450 Native workers in the sugar beet fields that
year, 2200 were freelance workers as opposed to a total of 250
Native wo=rkers that were sponsored .(18)
In -the late 1970s the size of the labour force in the sugar
beet Industry begins to decline due to various changes in beet
growing methods . For example, in 1979 ASBGA Chairman, Walter
Strom, stated :
(72)
The work of your labour committee continues
to decline year by year . The reasons are seen in
the agricultural report, where nearly half of the
beets were space planted . This has decreased the
number of people required for hand labour in our
beet fields . We estimate that 1,000 to 1,200
workers came this year .(19)
Not only was the size of the work force declining but so was
the need for labour recruitment . In 1981 the ASBGA Labour
Committee reported that "sufficient labour was available to meet
all our requirements . Labour recruitment is not necessary now as
[it] was in previous years . All [Nlative workers that came to our
area were freelance . . . . 11 (20)
In 1988 the Canada Farm Labor Pool, which handled the
placement of sugar beet workers with farmers who needed labour,
changed its name to the Agricultural Employment Service (A . E .
S .) In this year the A . E . S . placed 953 Native sugar beet
workers with growers .(21) In 1989, Richard Butler and Ron Sutka
of the ASBGMB Labour Committee pointed out that the role of the
A . E . S . in the area of Native Job placement in the sugar beet
fields had declined over the years . They stated the following
:
During the last five years the placement of
beet workers through the A . E . S
. has consistantly
shown a decline . When assessing the cause of the
decline in placements, it is not difficult to
identify at least some of the reasons why . Firstly,
the workers have become better acquainted with the
beet growing area . They also have advanced in self
mobility aiding them to locate employment on their
own, resulting in less inquiry through A . E . S
. by
both farmer and workers as to available labour and
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jobs . on farm management of weed control through
chemical control has played a part in reducing the
need for beet workers .(22)
In the same report Butler and Sutka pointed out that the labour
demanded by farmers was for more skilled workers . They state :
"Indications from the current situation surrounding the demand
for labour would indicate that the demand is beginning to take on
a different profile than in the past ; namely, the knowledge to
carry out safe and precise chemical application, high quality
truck drivers and machine operators ."(23)
In 1989/90 a Canadian Sugar Beet Producers' Association
advisory group conducted a study on Native labour in southern
Alberta's
	
sugar beet industry . At this time Lethbridge
Agriculture Employment Services Manager, Frances McArthur,
estimated that 3,000 short-term workers were employed in sugar
beet work .(24) He concluded that 85% of the work force was made
up of Native families .(25) The average crew size was 10 with the
most successful_ being family groups consisting of mother, father,
children-,and extended members . Also, it was found that the
majority''o€ the workers still came from northern Alberta and
northern Saskatchewan . At Prince- Albert, Saskatchewan,
Agriculture Employment Service Manager, Howard Smith, pointed out
that the main reserves in northern Saskatchewan that beet workers
came from were Sandy Lake, Sturgeon Lake, Beardy's Reserve at
Duck Lake, Shaganess Nut Lake Reserve and Montreal Lake .(26)
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The biggest demand for this labour was for hoeing, cultivating
and in those areas where herbicides were not affective,
Many of these beet workers had returned year after year
weeding .
and some
came from families of the 3rd or 4th generation of beet
workers .(27)
In the early 1990s, the use of Native labour declined while
at the same time labour demand called for more skilled
workers .(28) In 1992 the ASBGMB Labour Representative, Bernard
Lyczewski, stated : "The labour needs for agriculture in the
future seem to be going to a more skilled type . Manual labour
will probably always be needed, but as technology becomes better,
these needs will be less ."(29) Even with the recent decline in
the number of workers, it is still Natives that supply the
majority of the necessary labour power in southern Alberta's
sugar beet industry .
The Role of the State in the Annual Migration of Natives to
Alberta's Sugar Beet Fields
A number of non-academic studies have been . done on various
aspects of the annual migration of Natives to the sugar beet
industry in southern Alberta . A study done in 1969 stated
that Natives migrated annually because "it was a fast way to make
a few 'bucks'"(30) Moreover, the author of the study stated : "It
would also appear to be a social event for some : a time for
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renewing and making acquaintances, for romancing and arranging
marriages, and, it seems, for a few, a time of orgies!"(31) In
another study done in 1971, the author pointed out that various
government officials involved in the sugar beet industry in
southern Alberta stated that "the annual movement is something of
a 'holiday' for the Indian . . . . Indians come to the sugar beet
fields to meet old friends, meet new people, and generally to
'have a good time' ."(32) Such explanations for the annual
migration of Natives to the sugar beet fields are largely
immpressionistic and in many cases are of questionable validity .
It may be that over a period f time the annual movement of
Natives to the sugar beet fields became a social event . However,
what needs to explained is exactly how it came to be that a
Native migrant labour force to the sugar beet fields developed
given the fact that the work was so difficult and that the area
of employment was so distant from their home region . In order to
understand how a Native migrant labour force developed in
southern Alberta's sugar beet industry, it is necessary to
examine the role of the state .
The recruitment of Natives for employment in southern
Alberta's sugar beet fields was initiated and accomplished
through a cooperative effort by industry and numerous branches of
government . In 1964 an ASBGA report stated :
while the N . E . . has been a key figure in
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this movement of workers, it is only . fulfilling the
task that it ewas actually formed to do by being an
active employment service and forseeing the needs of
industry in its area . Although it has been the key
figure, it has been by no means alone . The tremendous
cooperation which has been noticeable in this work
has brought together many branches of government and
industry . Working in conjunction with the employment
service has been the Canadian Sugar Factories and the
Alberta Sugar Beet Growers, together with the Department
of Indian Affairs and the Department of Agriculture of
the Province of Alberta, working through the Federal
Provincial Farm Labour Committee .(33)
Initially, the Federal Provincial Farm Labour Committee or
as it was called in the mid-1960s, the Federal-Provincial
Agricultural Manpower Committee (FPAMC), was established as a
result of the Federal-Provincial Agricultural Agreements . The
origin of these Agreements date back to 1942 when the Federal-
Provincial Farm Labour Program was initiated .
The Federal-Provincial Farm Labour Program
was initiated under National Selective Service
in 1942 to provide for co-operative action among
local, provincial and federal agencies in the
solution of wartime farm labour problems . The
Program, based on annual agreements signed
between the federal Minister of Labour and the
provincial Minister of Agriculture, involved a
close working arrangement between provincial
Agricultural Extension and National Employment
Service officers . Full utilization of local supplies
of labour and farm equipment recruited through
community programs, organized interprovincial
movements of urgently needed farm workers, and
interprovincial movement of workers and equipment
between Canada and the United States were
prominent features .(34)
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In the early post-war period farm labour shortages continued
and thus it was decided that the Federal-Provincial Farm Labour
Program be maintained as an important supplement to the work of
the National Employment Service . Since World War II many
employers in Canada came to regard the federal government as
having the responsibility to provide for manpower supply and the
recruitment and movement of workers throughout Canada .(35)
As in the past, the Federal-Provincial Agricultural .
Agreements were part of the Agricultural Manpower Program which
was specifically designed to provide special services to the
agricultural market .(36) In 1969 an Agricultural Manpower Program
Directive pointed out the purpose of the Federal-Provincial
Agricultural Agreements as follows :
Parliament appropriates monies for the
Department of Manpower and Immigration to assist
the provinces in carrying out the provisions of
the Agricultural Manpower Agreements, including
agricultural manpower recruitment and movement,
research, promotion of improvements in working
and living conditions and other matters relating
to the development and utilization of agricultural
manpower .(37)
The Agreements provided for the establishment of Federal and
Provincial Agricultural Manpower Committees . The Committees were
to provide guidance and advice to the Minister of Manpower and to
parties to the Agreement concerning manpower in the farming
industry . As well, the Committees were to "take cognizance of
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trends in agricultural manpower
supply and demand, working
conditions in agriculture, the need for training and/or
retraining of agricultural manpower and methods of improving the
mobility of manpower within the farming industry ."(38)
The federal part of the joint Committee was composed of the
Chairmen of the Provincial Agricultural Manpower Committees,
officers of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, as well
as representatives from other interested federal departments and
farm organizations . The Chairman f the Committee was the
Assistant Deputy Minister of Manpower who was appointed byy the
Minister of Manpower .
The provincial part of the Committee consisted of Committees
from the provinces . Each Committee was composed of a senior
officer of the Provincial Department of Agriculture who acted as
Chairman, representatives of the Department of Manpower and
Immigration, and other members that the Minister of Agriculture
for the province may appoint
. The Provincial Committee assessed
the labour circumstances of the farming industry in the province
and then advised the Department of Manpower and Immigration of
agricultural manpower
	
needs . It also recommended suitable
programs t meet labour requirements
. Lastly, the Committee
established guidelines for wages and working and living
conditions. which were to be met by employers of workers recruited
and moved under this Agreement .(39)
The recruitment of workers was carried out by the Canada
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Manpower Centres (CMC) of the Department of Manpower and
Immigration in conjunction with provincial agencies . Also, the
referral and necessary movement of farm workers was undertaken by
the Canada Manpower Centres and the provinces agreed to cooperate
and provide all possible assistance to the Centres .(40)
The Agreement provided for an equal (50-50) sharing of all
costs incurred by either party . Cost sharing under Schedule "A"
Part I of the Agreement however, required prior approval of the
expenditures by the Minister of Manpower and Immigration . The
expenditures that needed the approval of the Minister included
the following :
Advertising, publicity and related promotional
expenditures undertaken by the Province for the
recruitment of agricultural manpower outside the
Province
Expenditures for research and development involved
in surveys of recruitment, movement and promotion of
improvement in working and living conditions and other
matters relating to agricultural manpower .
Expenditures made in connection with housing for
seasonal' workers under the Agreement for construction
of new housing and renovation of existing buildings .
Expenditures in connection with the operation of camps
for workers including : . . . rental of camps . . . . including
maintance and repair . . . rental or purchase price of
necessary camp equipment-necessary premiums to cover
insurance on camps and camp equipment owned jointly by
the parties to this Agreement, and premiums for
accident insurance and workmen's compensation covering
the officials and employees connected with the
operating of camps . . . staff salaries and necessary
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travelling expenses of camp supervisors and other
necessary related expenses .
The purchase price of office equipment necesssary
for carrying out activities under this Agreement .(41)
Costs that were incurred under Schedule "A" Part II of the
Agreements did not require prior approval of the Minister of
Manpower and Immigration . These are summarized as follows :
The salary and travelling expenses of staff appointed
or assigned by the Province to assist the Canada
Manpower Division of the Department of Manpower and
Immigration of Canada in recruitment and referral
of workers when engaged in these activities .
Advertising, publicity and promotional expenditures
undertaken by the Province for the recruitment of
agricultural manpower within the Province .
Rentals for office and other space accommodation
where space is not available from the Province or
Canada .
Rentals of office equipment and maintenance of this
equipment ; necessary telephone, telegraph and
postage charges .
Expenses incidental to the operation of the Provincial
Agricultural Manpower Committee and of Local Committees
established under the program, including honoraria to
designated members of these committees of other
specifically named part-time representatives
.
Transportation expenses of workers and their families
and effects moved under this Agreement, including
emergency subsistence of meals and lodgings
. Where
workers are moved to more than one Province during the
period of an organized movement each Province's share
will be based on the estimated length of time in the
aggregate the workers are employed in the Province
.
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Emergency hospital, medical treatment and other
necessary expenses in respect of personal injuries by
accidents or illnesses suffered by . . . workers recruited
under this agreement and their dependents, during the
course of their employment . . . .workers recruited under
this agreement and their dependents in the course of
transit to or from the workers place of employment . . . .
staff members in the course of their employment in
approved camps .
Hospital, medical and other accident or illness
expenses will only be paid under this agreement
provided that the workers, dependents and camp staff
members are not covered by workmen's compensation or
a provincial hospital or medical plan .(42)
Following 1969 accounts -for expenditures under Part=; II,
Schedule A, were submitted by the provinces on a quarterly basis .
The accounts were processed by the provincial Department of
Finance and passed to the Financial and Management Services of
the Department of Manpower and Immigration . The Assistant Deputy
Minister of Manpower then certified the accounts for payment .(43)
The Chairman of the Federal Agricultural Manpower Committee
(Assistant Deputy Minister of Manpower) was responsible for
preparing the new Agricultural Manpower Agreements each year . The
Chairman was also in charge of assembling an annual meeting to
review manpower activities and programs carried out by the
Provincial Committees for the previous year . At the annual
meeting manpower needs for the agricultural
	
industry were
estimated for the coming year and programs were designed to meet
the demands . The Provincial Committees were required to complete
an annual report for the Federal Committee to be used as a basis
for review . Each region of the Department Manpower and
Immigration was responsible for submitting an annual report to
the Assistant Deputy Minister of Manpower describing activities
throughout the previous year that related to Federal-Provincial
Agricultural Manpower requirements .(44)
The provisions of the Agreements were reviewed annually in
order to bring them up-to-date and consistant with existing
agricultural-conditions . Consequently, the activities under the
Agreements changed over the years in conjunction with the changes
and development in Canada's agricultural sector and economy .
The Federal-Provincial Agricultural Manpower Committee was
responsible throughout Canada for the administration of the
agricultural manpower requirements . The Provincial Committees
assessed the labour requirements for the coming year and informed
the Department of Manpower and Immigration . The information was
then passed on to the Canada Manpower Centres of the Department
of Manpower and Immigration and they carried out the recruitment,
referral and movement of workers in conjunction with the
provincial agencies .
In Alberta, the Provincial Committee was very involved with
recruiting labour for the sugar beet industry . Moreover,
throughout most of the FPAMC's existence the Provincial Committee
of Alberta largely represented sugar beet interests . In 1969
Prairie Regional Director of Manpower, J . W . Edmonds, stated
:
(83)
He goes on to point out the following :
(84)
In Alberta the Provincial Agricultural
Manpower Committee is concerned mainly with
recruitment, movement and referral of sugar beet
workers . The committee in Alberta is heavily
represented by the sugar beet and vegetable industry .
The expenditures incurred by the Alberta Committee
are mostly on behalf of the sugar beet industry . . . . (45)
In contrast to the other provinces the activities
by the Alberta Committee almost exclusively depend on
the Indian and Metis people living in Alberta and
Saskatchewan for their labour supply . While some sugar
beet thinning and hoeing in Southern Alberta is done by
other workers such as family labour, high school
children and farm workers - of other ethnic origin the
largest acreage of sugar beets are worked by the
transient workers consisting of native Indian and
Metis . The proportion of the acreage worked by the
Indian and Metis is increasing each year . For example,
in 1964 less than 50% of the acreage was done by these
workers, whereas in 1967, 63% of the sugar beets were
worked by them .(46)
The Department of Indian Affairs and Native Migrant Labour
Besides the Department of Manpower and Immigration, the
other branch of the federal government that was highly active in
labour recruitment for southern Alberta's sugar beet industry was
Indian Affairs (currently the Department of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development) . During the early 1950s when the supply
of immigrant labour to the sugar beet fields declined Indian
Affairs was instrumental in initiating the use of Indian labour
.
reference to this period, Prairie Regional Director of
Manpower, J . W. Edmonds stated
: "During these years the Indian
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Affairs Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration
was looking for employment opportunities for Indians and while
most of this potential labour force had little experience working
on farms the idea of using them in the sugar beet fields was
conceived ."(47)
By the mid-1950s Indian labour from reserves was brought
into Southern Alberta on a major scale with the full cooperation
of Indian Affairs . In 1956 ASBGA Labour Committee Chairman, Leith
Johnson, stated :
On January 30 and 31 a labour delegation attended
a convention of Indian Agents from Alberta and the
Northwest Territories in Edmonton . We were well
pleased with the favorable reports the Indians have
taken back with them of the money earned and treatment
received from the farmers . The agents reported that it
was very likely a greater number of Indians would be
coming to the beet fields in 1957 . Mr . Jones,
supervisor of Indian Affairs in Saskatchewan has given
us his assurance of full co-operation of all his
agents .(48)
In the 1960s the Indian Branch of the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration was heavily involved in promoting
the movement of Indians to the sugar beet fields of southern
Alberta . For instance, in the spring of 1966 the outlook for
obtaining the necessary seasonal agricultural workers in the
prairie region was in doubt . However, with the assistance of
Indian Affairs the necessary labour force was procured
. At the
annual meeting of the Federal-Provincial Agricultural Manpower
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Conference in November of 1966, the Assistant Deputy Minister and
Director General of Manpower, G . G . Duclos, stated :
It was obvious that the labour required was not
going to be forthcoming unless every effort was
made to involve as much as possible those groups
of the population which were in the best position
to contribute to this kind of effort . One such
group consists of our Indian citizens . Starting
at Ottawa with discussions between ourselves and
the Indian Affairs Branch, and continuing in the
regions and at the local level between the local
officers of the Manpower Division, the local office
of the Indian Affairs Branch and the growers,
discussions paved the way for the greater use of
Indians . . . . (49)
Not only was the Indian Affairs heavily involved in
recruitment of Indians, it also thankful of the sugar beet
industry for hiring Indians . In the minutes of the 1966 annual
Federal-Provincial Agricultural Manpower Conference in Ottawa, it
is stated :
Mr . R . F . Battle, Assistant Deputy Minister
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, said
-that the Indian Affairs Branch was pleased with the
-increase*in the movement of Indians . . . . of the 3,000
engaged in the southern Alberta sugar beet and
vegetable harvest, 1,727 had come from Saskatchewan,
883 from Alberta . . . .He also expressed appreciation
to the sugar beet and food processing industry for
providing employment opportunities for Indians, and
to the officials of the Department of Manpower and
Immigration and the Department of Agriculture for
their co-operation in assisting the movement of
Indians to farm work .(50)
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Also, the Department of Manpower and Immigration was pleased
that Indian Affairs was active in recruitment from reserves
because of the benefits for the Indians . At the end of the 1966
agricultural season Assistant Deputy Minister of Manpower, G . G .
Duclos, stated :
The labour problem of the sugar beet industry was
largely met by a much more intensive use of Indian
labour from the Northern Reserves . Over 3,000 such
workers were recruited for the industry, a substantial
increase over previous years, and probably a record
for this kind of recruitment . I cannot forebear
remarking here that one of the more gratifying aspects
of the agriculture situation this year to us in Ottawa
has been the much more intensive, and much more
successful use of Indian labour, and the consequent
provision to the Indians of a much better income level,
than they have known for a long time .(51)
By the early 1970s the pattern of recruitment of Natives was
well established . The FPAMC got requests for workers from the
local beet farmers in southern Alberta . It forwarded the requests
to the office of the Canada Manpower Centre in Lethbridge
. Then
the CMC, i liaison with the Indian Affairs, circulated the
requests among its offices near reserves and Metis communities
.
As the beet season began, the regional offices sent letters
and
application forms to the chiefs and the band councils on the
reserves . The applications were for summer jobs hoeing sugar
beets . The Indians filled out the applications and returned them
to the CMC offices
. As the need for labour in the sugar fields
commenced, chartered buses transported the successful applicants
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from their homes to the Reception Centre in Lethbridge . Once the
workers left the bus *in Lethbridge, Manpower withdrew from the
process and FPAMC officials took over .(52)
The reception, registration and allocation of the workers
was in the hands of the FPAMC officials . Usually the officials
tried to schedule the arrival of the buses in the morning or
early in the afternoon to allow for the registration, allocation
and transportation of workers to farms all in one day . If workers
were not allocated on the day of arrival, they were provided with
meals and sleeping accomodations at the Reception Centre .(53) :
In the early 1970s Indian Affairs was actively doing its
part to meet the labour needs of beet farmers . For instance, in
1970 ASBGA _Labour Committee Chairman, Walter Strom, informed
farmers of the following : "Indian Affairs now have a training
program for their people which some of you may want to use .
Basically, they will pay half the wages of an Indian trainee,
engaged in farm labour, for a three-month period ."(54)
By the mid-1970s most Natives were coming to the sugar beet
fields outside of the sponsored movement . Consequently, in 1975
the FPAMC eliminated the policy of providing transportation for
Native workers to the sugar beet fields
.(55) From this period and
onward, freelance workers that came to the sugar beet fields
would go to the Lethbridge Farm Labour Pool office for placement
on farms .(56) Thereafter, it was the Lethbridge Farm Labour Pool
Office that recorded the number of Native workers placed in the
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sugar beet fields . However, this record was largely non-
representative of the number of Natives working in the fields
because many returned to the same farmer year
after year without
informing the Labour Pool Office . Eventually, in 1981 ASBGA
Labour Committee Chairman, Norman Hall, reported that all the
Native workers that came to the sugar beet fields were freelance
and therefore labour recruitment was not necessary
.(57)
The State and the Recruitment of Native Labour
The federal and provincial governments along with sugar
beet
growers and processors used an array of paternalistic
or levers that were designed compel
or induce Natives to
migrate to the sugar beet fields . Moreover, once
they were in the
fields mechanisms were used to pressure
them into staying in the
employment of the industry .
one way of inducing
Natives to migrate to the
sugar beet
fields and encouraging
them to stay was through involvement in
community social events
. For example, in the latter part of the
1950s Native workers were guests of the beet growers, B
. C . Sugar
and the National Employment Service at the annual summer stampede
at Raymond
. In referring to Native beet workers in 1956, ASBGA
Labour Chairman, Leith Johnson, stated
: "These people were
entertained as guests on July 2 at the Raymond Stampede by the
Beet Growers, Sugar Company and the National Employment Service
.
mechanisms
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It is hoped that this gesture will result in these people
returning to the beet fields in 1957 ."(58) And, in 1959 Johnson
also stated : "The Stampede celebration at Raymond July 1st, where
an estimated 1200 Indians including children, were guests of the
Growers, Sugar Company and National Employment service was
again a success . Cost of this outing was just over $2000 and was
shared 50-50 by Growers and Sugar Company ."(59)
Another way that the government induced Natives to migrate
from Saskatchewan and Alberta was by chartering buses and paying
part of their transportation costs to the the sugar beet fields .
As early as 1955 the federal and provincial governments policy
was to ask Native workers to pay for one-third of their
transportation cost to the sugar beet fields and they would pay
the remainder .(60) However, as the Native labour force increased
in size in following years the government felt that the sugar
beet industry should cover some of the expense . In 1960 the ASBGA
Labour Committee Chairman, Leith Johnson, stated :
At a labour meeting held January 4, 1961, Mr .
Gramham stated that the Government was of the opinion
that this labour movement to the beet areas was
becoming too expensive as it had increased annually
and was likely to continue to increase, and were now
proposing that the industry absorb a part of the
expense . The average one-way incoming faze in 1960 from
Alberta and Saskatchewan was $13 .25 . The Indian pays
$5 .00 and the Government absorbs the difference or
$8 .25 per person . Someone has got to continue to pay
this difference, either the Government, the Indian, the
farmer that receives the labour, or the industry as a
whole .(61)
when most of the workers were freelance
sponsored movement . At this time the ASBGA Labour Committee
Chairman, Walter Strom, stated : "For over twenty years our main
source of hand labour has come from the Indian reserves of
northern Alberta and northen Saskatchewan . All through these
years
	
charter buses have featured prominently in the
transportation of these workers . At least this statement was true
until 1975 . Last summer, no charter buses were used, and only 25
workers were brought in by bus on Individual travel
warrants ."(63)
Sugar beet farmers also provided workers with housing and
utilities while in their employment as a means of attracting and
retaining labour . This fact was made clear in 1957 when ASBGA
Labour Committee Chairman, Leith Johnson, stated : "I would like
t again stress the importance of suitable housing as an
important factor in attracting beet labour to our farms, and then
keeping them over from year to year ."(64)
(91)
Although the government asked the industry to cover some of the
increasing cost for transportation, nothing changed except for an
increase in the Native's share of the transportation cost which
was raised to $7 .50 per worker from the $5 .00 charged
previously .(62) For the return journey the Canada Manpower Centre
at Lethbridge issued tickets at a charge of $7 .50 per worker .
The government continued to cover the bulk of the
transportation cost for the Native workers until the mid-1970s
and thus outside of the
In 1965 the ASBGA was aware that some changes had to be
made, particularly in regards to labour force housing, if it
wanted to keep the flow of Native workers coming to the sugar
beet fields . ASBGA Labour Committee Chairman, Leith Johnson,
pointed out that "indications are that we will have to raise the
labour scale per acre, if we hope to come close to attracting
enough workers to fill our needs . Suggestions have been made that
we try a few hostels in different parts of the beet area . The
Department of Health and welfare -seem to favor this type of
housing as this would be one means of providing modern faculties
for more people, such as gas heat, electricity, hot and cold
water, etc ."(65) In the following year ASBGA Labour Committee
Chairman, Walter Strom, reported :
This past summer - six farmers in the Iron Springs
area joined forces to start the first Agricultural
Manpower Hostel in this area, using Indian workers .
Thirty-five workers were housed in individual cottages
but fed in a central dining room, which also served as
a recreation center . The success of this venture can be
attributed to the fact that these farmers went beyond
what could ordinarily be expected of them, in caring
for the needs of their workers, and in providing
supervision in the field . The workers were transported
in a school bus, purchased by the farmers, and the
farmer whose field was being hoed was driver and field
supervisor .(66)
1966 the ASBGA was also active in pursuing the
construction of more hostels for migrant workers . It asked "that
the provincial and federal government give a grant of forty
(92)
percent of the cost of a hostel and finance the balance as a
long-term loan ."(67) *In the ASBGA's view the financing was
necessary
	
upgrade the housing for migrant workers as this
would attract more workers and alleviate some of the labour
shortage which was evident in the fields the previous year .(68)
In the following year Strom stated
The Labour Hostels at Iron Springs and Raymond
once again proved their worth in better care of crews
and better quality of work done by them. Our request
for a 40% grant toward construction cost of hostels was
agreed to by the provincial and federal governments .
Four farmers east of Picture Butte . have organized
"Coyote Flats Labour Hostel ." They are planning to
erect two buildings consisting of a dormitory and a
kitchen-dining room and washing unit . There is keen
interest in some other areas, and we hope farmers will
proceed so that the money set aside last year will be
used before the end of the fiscal year March 31 as
after that date whatever portion that is not used will
be cancelled .(69)
As a result of encouragement of the ASBGA, in 1968 Strom was able
to report that five hostel units had qualified for the government
grant of 40% of the cost of construction, additions or
improvements . Moreover, this grant included the "cost of the
vehicles used to transport the workers to the fields
."(70)
By
the end of the 1960s the federal and Alberta provincial
governments had provided grants for several years for beet labour
hostels . However, in some years the grant money was not used
. As
a result, in 1969 when there were no more new applications for
hostels, the grant was reduced by more than 50%
.(71)
(933)
(94)
In 1969 when the grant money for hostels was reduced the
ASBGA took a new approach to housing assistance . That is, it
requested "the housing program be extended to individual farms on
the same basis as to hostels under the Federal-Provincial
agreement ."(72) Consequently, in 1970 ASBGA Labour Committee
Chairman, Walter Strom, reported : "Last year we requested, and
were granted, a change in labour housing assistance . Grants are
now available to individual farmers for seasonal labour housing
at a maximum of $150 .00 per worker or $2,000 per farmer,
whichever is less . The grant is also limited to 40% of total
cost ."(73)
Throughout the 1970s the federal and provincial governments
provided beet farmers with grants to improve seasonal labour
housing . For instance, in 1971 housing grants were provided, but
the assistance formula was changed . The assistance was still
$150 .00 per worker, with a maximum of $2,000 .00 per farmer, based
on 10 acres per worker . However, the two levels of government
were now willing to pay up to 50% of the cost instead of the 40%
paid previously .(74) These - new rules applied to new housing or to
the upgrading of existing housing . Then, in 1972 the ASBGA
announced that the government assistance for seasonal labour
housing had increased to $300 .00 per worker, with a maximum of
$2,000 per farmer and the farmer's input of labour would also
count toward his half of the project .(75) In the following year,
the assistance for upgrading labour housing came under two
(95)
programs . One was still the grant of $300 .00 per worker with
a
maximum of $2,000 .00 . The other, however, was the government
sponsored Priority Employment Program . In this program
	
a
carpenter repair crew did the housing repairs and the federal and
provincial governments paid for the labour as long as the farmer
provided the materials .(76) Again in 1974 the housing programs
were expanded . The grant was increased to $500 .00 per worker up
to $4000 .00 maximum per farmer . And, under the Priority
Employment Program a second carpentry repair crew was added .(77)
In 1977 the government grant for labour housing repair was
cancelled .(78) However, the Priority Employment Program was
continued and lasted until the end of 1983 .(79) Although the
ASBGMB attempted to get the housing program reinstated in
subsequent years, government officials informed it that "in 1983
the housing program was terminated due to the fact that demand
for it had become almost non-existent and because government
was committed to reducing expenditures ."(80)
During the 1960s the Department of Indian Affairs put forth
a number of recommendations and initiated various programs
ultimately aimed at inducing and retaining Indians as a workforce
for Alberta's sugar beet industry . In most cases it worked
together with other government agencies and the sugar beet
industry to implement these recommendations and programs .
At a National Agricultural Manpower meeting in Ottawa in
1966 the federal representative of Indian Affairs, D . Jackson,
(96)
stated : "Considering that the physical and financial efforts
expended to deliver a worker who stays
the same as that for one man who remains all season, our report
is a resume observations, conclusions and recommendations
indicating steps which might be taken to help the Indian worker
remain on the job"(81) The recommendations that Jackson made to
the Committee were as follows :
RecruitmentofIndianLabour
it is recommended that consideration be given to the
following :
Using Indians experienced in agriculture employment
to assist in recruiting workers .
Showing of the film on harvest operations as an aid to
recruitment .
Involving representatives of Grower's Associations in
recruitment .
Extending recruitment to communities beyond present
limits in view of good performances of northern Indians
this past summer .
Keepinq Workers on the Job
The most critical factor is the extent to which the
employer co-operates with respect to the following :
Establishes and maintains personal contact and
interest in the worker .
Provides properly equipped accommodation of an
acceptable standard .
Provides facilities for the Indians to board themselves
according to their individual tastes in food .
on the job for one day is
(97)
Affords the worker an opportunity to rest after an
arduous 3-4 day trip south .
Promotes orientation to new work setting and community .
Instructs Indians adequately in preferred harvesting
techniques .
Defines conditions of employment and rates of pay,
preferably in writing .
Recognizes dependence of Indians on native leadership .
Exempts employees from harvesting operations when field
or weather conditions unsuitable .
Recommended Aids to Keep-Workers on the Job
Consultation with leaders elected by Indian workers in
matters affecting or involving them .
Provision of transportation facilities for shopping,
recreation and sightseeing .
Waiving of charges for accommodations when workers
unemployed due to factors such as weather conditions
or others beyond their control .
As a further aid, Indian Affairs Branch is prepared to :
Make field staff available for consultation with Indian
workers and employees .
Maintain liaison between workers and their home
settlements .
Provide flims and other materials to farm labour
committees which would enable them to better
understand the Indian people .(82)
In the years following the recommendations made by the
Department of Indian Affairs many of the suggestions were acted
upon . For example, in 1973 the ASBGA, Manpower and Indian Affairs
began sending letters to former beet workers asking them to
return for the next sugar beet season . Also, the ASBGA and the
Sugar Company sent representatives directly to the reserves
order to encourage Natives to migrate to the beet fields . At the
time the ASBGA Labour Committee Chairman, Walter Strom stated :
The Central Board, in co-operation with
Manpower and Indian Affairs, instituted a campaign
of contacting as many former sugar beet workers as
possible by letter, inviting them to return to the
beet fields, and also asking them to invite friends
to come with them . Later on in the season, three
men from the Central Board and one from the Sugar
Company went out to the reserves and made personal,,
contact with the [N)ative people urging them to come .
t o Southern Alberta for the beet thinning .(83)
In the following year the same inducement tactic was used . In
commenting on
Walter Strom, stated :
In 1974 we followed the same labour recruiting
procedure as in 1973, with letters to both growers and
former beet workers, followed by public relations teams
travelling to the various C .M .C . offices, Indian
Affairs offices and Indian Reserves in Alberta and
Saskatchewan_. This program, which was very successful
in 1973,'proved to be equally successful in 1974 . In
carrying out our labour program, we appreciate very
much the co-operation of the Canada Manpower Centers
and Indian Affairs Branches of Alberta and
Saskatchewan, the Canadian Sugar Factories field staff,
and the staff of the Federal-Provincial Agricultural
Manpower Centre in Lethbridge, as well as the grower
employers, whose combined efforts contributed to a
minimum of labour problems .(84)
(98)
in
its success the ASBGA Labour Committee Chairman,
The campaign of contacting Natives by letter and travelling
to the various reserves to induce workers to migrate to the sugar
beet fields was continued with a great deal of success until
1980 .(85) Thereafter, the recruitment of labour was not
necessary
because all the Natives that went to the
Alberta's sugar beet
fields were freelance and came on their own .
Native Migrant Labour and the
Termination of Welfare Benefits
One of the most effective means of inducing
Natives to
migrate to Alberta's sugar beet industry and moreover, of
pressuring them to stay in the sugar beet fields until the beet
season ended, was to cut off their welfare payments in their home
region .
In 1970 John Schmidt of TheCalgaryHerald stated : "Of the
Indians recruited since 1953, over 90% were on welfare at the
time of recruitment ."(86) H
	
substantiated the information by
saying :
(99)
"My opinion is based on 12 years of observation and
brief by L . R . Jensen of Magrath, [Plresident of the Alberta
Sugar Beet Growers Association . . . . "(87)
In the same year in the
ASBGA annual report President, Lalovee Jensen, pointed out in
reference to Natives that "many had been on welfare" but
employment in the sugar beet industry had taken them "off welfare
rolls" .(88)
Cutting off welfare payments for Natives, particularly for
Treaty Indians on reserves, was a strong motivating force for
off ."(91) Also,
(100)
seeking employment in the sugar beet fields of southern Alberta .
A study done in 1969 that involved interviews with Treaty Indians
from Saskatchewan that worked in the sugar beet fields stated :
"Some families stated that they only came because they felt
obliged to - Welfare Payments were cut - but that they really
didn't want to do .,this type of work ."(89) The same study pointed
out that some of the Indian workers had received letters stating
that welfare payments would be cut off . For instance, Thomas
Lachance of the Big River Reserve who worked in the beet fields
of Taber, Alberta stated that he had been "living on Welfare
payments but received a letter saying that the payments were to
be cut off ."(90) In July of 1969 Henry Tomaschuk, a Canadian
Labour Congress representative, did a three-week investigative
report on Native migrant workers from Saskatchewan . He stated
:
"In talking to a large number of Indians and Metis people, I get
the story that these people are
told by the government either
they go out to the sugar beet fields or their welfare is cut
in 1969 John Ferguson, a Saskatchewan university
lecturer, and Barry Lipton, a reporter of the Prairie Fire
in
Regina, travelled to the beet fields of southern Alberta to
investigate the treatment of Native workers
. In their report they
stated the following :
one of the most unsavory aspects of the situation
the beet workers find themselves in is that they are
recruited for work in the fields under conditions of
(101)
compulsion or forced labour . At least two federal
government agencies and the welfare departments of two
provincial governments (Alberta and Saskatchewan) are
complicit in this process .
Canada Manpower working in co-operation with the
Federal Department of Indian Affairs recruits the
Indians for work in the fields from as far away as
Northern Saskatchewan .
And "co-operate" the Indian Affairs Branch does .
The Indian Affairs Branch has the policy of stopping
welfare payments during the summer, for all reserve
members but those on permanent welfare . The result is
that reserve members must leave the reserve during the
summer months to find work .(92)
Ferguson and Lipton also pointed out in their report that of
the number of reserve members that they interviewed who worked in
the sugar beet fields of southern Alberta eighty-five per cent of
them stated that they had tried to find work near their reserve
but none was available . Thus, they found that the majority of the
reserve members who had been cut off welfare had no alternative
but to travel to the sugar beet fields to find employment .(93)
In regards to non-treaty Indian and Metis people, Ferguson
and Lipton found that the government also cut off their welfare
payments in order to pressure them to migrate to the sugar beet
fields of Alberta . They stated :
The Alberta and Saskatchewan government welfare
agencies do their share by cutting off payments to
non-treaty Indian and Metis .
Then the buses cruise the Indian communities,
waiting to take them to work in the Alberta beet fields
for little pay and poor working and living
conditions .(94)
Conclusion
Clearly, the Canadian state was heavily involved in the
recruitment, movement and retention of Native workers in southern
Alberta's sugar beet industry . One of the primary ways in which
the state became involved in the sugar beet industry was through
the Federal-Provincial Agricultural Manpower Committee (FPAMC) .
The Federal-Provincial Agricultural Manpower Committee, initially
called the Federal Provincial Farm labour Committee until the
mid-1960s, was established as a result of the Federal-Provincial
Agricultural Agreements . These Agreements were signed annually
between the federal Minister of Manpower and the provincial
Minister of Agriculture . The two most prominent features of these
Agreements between the federal and provincial governments were
recruitment and movement of labour to areas of need in
agricultural sectors throughout Canada . This involved a close
working relationship between provincial agricultural agencies and
the Department of Manpower and Immigration .
The federal part of the FPAMC consisted of the Chairman of
the Provi-nc-ial Agticultural Manpower Committees, officers of the
Department of Manpower and Immigration and representatives from
other interested federal departments and farm organizations . The
Chairman of the Committee was the Assistant Deputy Minister of
Manpower . The provincial part of the FPAMC consisted f
Provincial Committees composed of a senior officer of the
provincial Department of Agriculture, representatives of the
(102)
Department of Manpower and Immigration and other members that the
Minister of Agriculture for the province may have appointed . The
Provincial Committee assessed the labour circumstances and then
advised the Department of Manpower and Immigration of
agricultural manpower needs . It also recommended programs to meet
labour
	
requirements . Lastly, the Provincial Committeee
established guidelines for wages and working and living
conditions which were to be met by employers of workers recruited
and moved under the Agreement .
The recruitment of workers was carried out by the Canada
Manpower Centres of the Department of Manpower and Immigration in
conjunction with provincial agencies . The Canada Manpower Centres
were also responsible for the referral and movement of farm
workers and the provinces agreed to cooperate and provide any
necessary assistance to the centres .
The costs involved in carrying out the provisions of the
Federal-Provincial Agricultural Manpower Agreements were shared
equally by the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the
Provinces
. These costs involved such things as advertising,
research; housing
for workers, insurance, salary and travel
expenses
f staff involved in recruitment, rental of office
equipment, and transportation and medical costs of workers
.
The Provincial Committee in Alberta was mainly involved
in
recruitment and movement of workers for
the sugar beet industry .
Consequently, most of the expenditures of Alberta's Committee was
on behalf of
representatives
Alberta's sugar
The other
involved in the
(104)
the sugar beet industry . Moreover, many of the
of the Provincial Committee were involved in
beet industry .
primary way in which the Canadian state became
sugar beet industry of
moved to work in the sugar beet fields was
southern Alberta was
through the Indian Affairs Branch . In the early 1950s when
immigrant labour to the sugar beet fields dwindled it was Indian
Affairs that conceived the idea of using Indian workers to fill
the job positions in the industry formerly done by immigrants . In
the years that followed the Indian Affairs Branch assisted the
FPAMC in the recruitment of Indians from northern Alberta and
northern Saskatchewan .
By the 1970s the way that Native labour was recruited and
well established . The
FPAMC received requests for workers from sugar beet farmers in
southern Alberta . The requests were forwarded to the Canada
Manpower Centres (CMG) in Lethbridge
. Then the CMG, with the
assistance of Indian Affairs, circulated the requests among its
offices near reserves and Metis communities
. When the need for
beet labourers commenced, the CMG regional offices sent
application forms to the chiefs and band councils on the
reserves
. Successful applicants were then transported to the
sugar beet fields by chartered buses
. Once the workers arrived in
southern Alberta, Manpower handed over responsibility to FPAMC
officials who registered and allocated the workers to the
farmers .
Throughout the process
	
procuring Native labour for
southern Alberta's sugar beet industry, the state utilized a
variety of mechanisms which were
Natives to migrate from their home region and once in the sugar
beet fields, pressuring them to stay for the length
of the beet
season . Usually the state accomplished the process
with the
of provincial agencies and the sugar beet industry .
In order to induce and retain Native workers the federal
government, in conjunction with the provincial government and the
sugar beet industry, invited Native workers as guests and paid
for their admission to annual summer
stampedes in beet regions ;
chartered buses and paid for the greater part of the cost of
their transportation t the sugar beet fields ; provided the
farmers with funding
(105)
ultimately aimed at inducing
aid
to build worker hostels and lastly, the
state provided funding to individual farmers to repair
worker
housing .
The Indian Affairs Branch also played
a large role in the
inducement and retention of Indians
for employment in the sugar
beet fields . Because if its close relationship
with Indian people
on reserves, it was able to make
numerous recommendations to
other federal and provincial departments as well as
to sugar beet
industry representatives which helped in
the inducement and
retention of Indians for the sugar beet
industry . Many of these
recommendations were eventually put into practise by the Indian
Affairs Branch with the assistance of the ASBGA and Canada
Manpower Centres . These included sending letters to former Native
employees asking them to return to the fields in the following
beet season and sending representatives from the ASBGA and the
Sugar Company directly to the various reserves to encourage
Indians to migrate to the beet fields . Lastly, the most effective
way that the Indian Affairs Branch induced Indians to migrate to
the sugar beet fields of southern Alberta and moreover, it
pressured them to remain there until the end of the beet season
was to cut off their welfare payments at their home reserve . In
regards to non-treaty and Metis individuals, they too had their
welfare payments cut off in their home regions by the provincial
government which effectively encouraged them to migrate to the
sugar beet fields in search of employment .
The next chapter will discuss the working conditions of
Natives in southern Alberta's sugar beet industry
. In doing so,
it will highlight some of the criticisms of the sugar beet
industry in terms of its treatment of Native workers
. It was
pointed out in chapter three that, in general, farmers received
low prices for their sugar beet crops . It was
also pointed out
that farmers suffered from increasing costs
	
of machinery,
fertilizers and weed control chemicals
. Farmers had no control
over these aspects in the sugar beet industry
. Thus in order to
off set these aspects that had a negative effect on their profit,
they maximized the exploitation of labour .
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Chapter Five : NativeWorkinqConditions inSouthernAlberta's
SuqarBeetIndustry
Prior to the introduction of mechanization and chemical weed
control in the sugar beet industry, sugar beet cultivation
was
"labour intensive" in nature . It was tedious, back-aching
stoop
labour and a worker had to sweat long hours under
the hot summer
sun for every acre of beets produced .(1) Before the early 1960s
sugar beets were grown from a multigerm seed which produced a
bunch rather than a single beet plant . Once germination occurred,
the bunch had to be weeded until only one plant remained . To
accomplish this task workers had to crawl along the rows on their
knees . Then, the tiny seedling had to be weeded as many as three
times during the growing season . When the plants reached maturity
in the fall they were harvested by hand
. This entailed knocking
the plants together to remove excess dirt and then they were
"topped" by cutting off their leaves and crown which made the
beets ready for shipment to the sugar processing factory
. By
comparison, it took approximately 115 hours of hand labour to
produce one acre of beets which is more
than ten times the amount
of labour required to produce one acre of grain
.(2) As a result,
in the 1920s and 30s most farmers that tried producing beets gave
up after one or two seasons
. Moreover, beet farmers soon found
that farm hands would do almost any other type of work before
they would accept the job of hoeing and harvesting beets
.(3)
Seasonal work in the beet fields began around mid-May and
sometimes a week later depending on the annual growing
conditions . This was the period when the plants needed thinning,
weeding and hoeing . Thus, it was also during this period that
there was a heavy demand for labour . This demand lasted until
mid-July and thereafter the majority of the workers returned to
their homes .
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, since the early
1950s when Natives from northern Alberta and Saskatchewan began
migrating each spring to the sugar beet fields of southern
Alberta, the state had been heavily involved in the recruitment,
relocation and retention of Native workers . This involvement
lasted up until the early 1980s . During this period, state
intervention in the economy of the sugar beet industry helped
farmers overcome many problems, particularly that of acquiring
sufficient labour to cultivate their crops . However, while state
intervention may have helped sugar beet farmers overcome many of
their problems, Native working conditions suffered .
Native Lab-our and the Sugar Beet Contract
The hoeing and weeding of beets were done on a contract basis
.
That is, beet work was done on the basis of agreements made
between the grower and the labourer
. In a study done in 1969,
Herman French described the pattern of the workers who signed the
contracts as follows :
The work is done by the contract piece . This
means that the worker can set his own hours of work .
He may also recruit as many helpers as he desires .
Sometimes a single family will be working one piece ;
other times two or more families will unite to
complete a single job . The time element seems also
to be an important factor : the worker can work early
in the morning or late in the evening as the
inclination (and need for cash) prompts him . This
means that several workers may be seen in town in the
late afternoons and particularly Saturday afternoons
and evenings . When one contract is completed, the
workers are free to go el-sewhere to contract other
jobs . The workers, then, not only set their own times
of work but their own mealtime pattern and, to an
extent, their own place of work .(4)
The "Alberta Cash Labour Contract- Sugar Beets" outlined the
conditions of employment and rates of pay . In the 1960s, the
Federal-Provincial Agricultural Manpower Committee (FPAMC) was
responsible for the recruitment of agricultural labour . Once
workers arrived in the sugar beet fields, the FPAMC provided them
with an information sheet that stated "all labour shall be
contracted labour
and shall sign the Alberta Cash Labour Contract
for Sugar Beet workers" .(5)
The contract called for
fixed fee for each stage of
cultivation . For instance, in a "Letter of Instruction and
Information, Sugar Beet and Vegetable Industry Workers, Season
1968-69" put out by Canada Manpower, it was
stipulated that the
grower had to pay the contractor a specific rate per acre upon
satisfactory completion of the contract . An acre was defined as
23,760 lineal feet of row . The contract included performing
Operation A or Operation B, but not both . The work performed and
rates of pay were as follows :
Operation A : Trimming
Removing weeds and excess beets . Total plant removal
not to exceed 50 plants,beets and weeds combined, per
100 feet of cultivated row	$9 .00
Plus per measured acre upon satisfcatory completion
of contract	 $3 .00
Total for Trimming $12 . .00
Hoeing $9 .00
Total for Operation A	 $21 .00
Operation B : Thinning
Removing weeds and excess beets . Total plant removal
exceeding 50 plants, weeds and beets combined per 100
feet of cultivated beet row	$14 .00
Plus per measured acre upon satisfactory completion
of contract	 $3
.00
Total for thinning $17 .00
Hoeing $9
.00
Total for Operation B	
$26 .00
Operation C :
If, through cultural practices, the beet field warrants
a once-over job only, the price will be $12 .00 per
- acre unless otherwise agreed between the grower and the
worker . (6)
In 1969, the average worker could do an acre per day .(7)
Therefore, this meant that the worker could earn as much as
$17 .00 per day or more in some cases
. However, a worker was not
always able to work everyday of the beet season
. In most weeks,
wind or rain or some other factor made it impossible to get in
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six days of work . As well, although beet farmers staggered growth
across the districts, there was usually a waiting period of
several jobless days or even weeks between the first and second
hoeings .(8) In a study done by Elizabeth Steele and Calvin
Zacharias, entitled The Suqar BeetFields ofSouthern Alberta,
May-September, 1971, it was estimated at this time that the
entire migrant labour force, which numbered 2,000, earned a total
of $600,000 from hoeing sugar beets . This translated into an
average of $300 .00 per worker for the beet season .(9)
In 1969 John Ferguson, a school teacher and former employee
of Indian Affairs and Barry Lipton, a reporter for Prairie
Fire, published a report in The Native People entitled,
"Exploitation and Discrimination in the Alberta Beet Fields", on
the working conditions of Natives in southern Alberta's sugar
beet industry . The report sparked a controversy over Native
working conditions that lasted for two years and its effects were
felt for many years thereafter . The authors cited numerous
instances where beet farmers exploited Native workers . In regard
to wages, for example, they stated :
We talked to a group of Indian field workers and
asked them if they had been short-changed in their pay-
cheques or knew of people who had been . David
Courtoreille answered first .
"Yes, I've seen a lot of cheatin'," And a lotta
poor Indians got that too--they don't know the
difference . A lotta these farmers, you know, they think
the Indians are dumb . . . . "(10)
In another
interview with a beet worker named Clarence Miller,
Ferguson and Lipton were informed :
"There's a lot of Indians that can't read or write
down here . All they talk is Cree and Chipewyan and a
lot of them don't even read or write--they can't even
spell their name or nothin' ."
"They pay them out in cash and Lord knows what
happens then . They don't give a written statement . I
know myself I got beat, even on the labour . I still
didn't get my payment from spring . . . 11 (11)
Ferguson and Lipton also found that Native workers had been
exploited by the farmers through lengthening of the beet rows .
In the interview with beet worker Clarence Miller, Ferguson and
Lipton were told : 'The biggest problem with the beets
. . . is that
one year they measure out a field, then if the same person works
on it next year, like they expect it to be the same length and
then they, the farmers, they do about four or five rows more, you
know, and do more beets along side, a little bit, you know,
lengthen the rows . Then they expect the Indians to accept the
same amount of payment .'(12)
Also, in 1969,
the working conditions of Natives in southern
Alberta's sugar beet industry gained Canada wide attention when
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) aired
national television in
which it was alleged that Native migrant
workers were subjected to a
a film on
number of indignities .(13) During
this same period a number of spokespersons for various provincial
and national groups voiced their concerns
on the Native working
conditions in southern Alberta's sugar beet industry . For
instance, Henry Tomaschuk, Canadian Labour Congress
Represenative, Roy Jamha, Alberta Federation of
Labour President,
and Grant Notley, Alberta New Democratic Party Leader, were
highly critical of the conditions of the migrant workers .(14)
As a result of all the criticism of the working conditions
in southern Alberta's sugar beet industry, in 1970 a group of
representatives from a number f organizations concerned about
the allegations that were made, established an Independent
Committee
	
to investigate the matter . The organizations
represented on the Committee included the following : Alberta
Federation of Labour, Indian Association of Alberta, United
Alliance for the Advancement of Native People, Canadian Labour
Congress, Metis Association of Alberta, and the Alberta Human
Rights Association .(15) In regards to pay rates the report
stated : "Jobs are contracted on an amount per acre, one acre
equalling an average of 4 1/2 row miles
. When this is understood,
the amount paid per acre is seen to be by no means generous
.
Increases in contract rates do not appear to have kept pace with
increases-
in the cost of living and wage increases obtained in
other sections of the economy ."(16)
Thus, one of the
recommendations the Committee made to the sugar beet industry
stated : "Minimum contract rate for hand operations in the sugar
beet fields should be set by the FPAMC, and should reflect more
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immediately increases in the cost of living and wage increases in
other sectors of the ecomony ."(17)
In the period following the controversy that erupted over
the working conditions of Natives in 1969-70, the concern over
wages paid to Native workers did not subside . As recently as 1981
the ASBGA Labour Committee Chairman, Norman J . Hall reported that
the Industry had received requests from Native leaders to
increase the wage rate paid to contract workers . At the time Hall
stated : " In April, your Labour Committee along with Mr . Gil
Evans of the Local Agricultural Manpower Board met with a
delegation from Saskatchewan . Chief John George, Chief' Fred
Thomas
	
and Indian Affairs representative Arnold Ahenakew
requested a rate increase in the labour contract ."(18) At the
time, however, the Native leaders were satisfied once it was
pointed out to them that the 1981 labour contract included a 12%
increase in wages .(19)
Once the contract was signed workers had to remain with the
farmer regardless of the working conditions . For example, if
workers found that the beet fields were a lot more weedy than
expected, they would still have -to do the work because the
contrac was binding .(20) Consequently, rather than sign a
contract many of the workers would survey the field and then
bargain with the farmer until they came to a verbal agreement .
However, in many cases where a contract was never signed farmers
tended to enforce the terms of a contract anyway . In particular,
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they resorted to the three-dollar per acre hold-back clause until
the work was done to their satisfaction .(21)
As well, disputes inevitably arose between the farmer and the
worker over the definition of "satisfactory completion" as stated
in the contract . The contracts covered arbitration procedures in
the case of such disputes . Differences of opinion between farmer
and contractor were arbitrated by field men of the Canadian Sugar
Factories Ltd . The study done by Steele and Zacharias in 1971
commented on the appropriateness of this dispute procedure . They
stated :
The field men are closely associated with the
industry, they have a good close relationship
to the Alberta Sugar Beet Growers Association .
The workers cannot believe they are likely to
favour Indians oz Metis over growers . They
suspect that , in the arbitration procedures,
a conspiracy of white interest groups may be
exploiting them .(22)
Similarly, the study entitled, Report of an Independent
Committee of Inquiry Established to Examine the Conditions of
Miqrant Workers in-the Suqar Beet Industry in Alberta, stated
following:
the
Arbitration procedures in the case of disputes
are covered in the contract . Differences of opinion
between farmer and contractor are arbitrated by field
men of the Canadian Sugar Factories Ltd . While not
impugning the impartially of these officials it would
be desirable to have independent arbitration or at
least a representative from one of the (N)ative
peoples' association to assist in the arbitration of
disputes . It has been alleged that some growers attempt
to defraud the workers and one FPAMC field man admitted
this to be true, though only of a few farmers .(23)
The sugar
	
beet contract also included a section on
transportation for workers . For instance, the Canada Manpower
Centre "Letter f Instruction and Information, Sugar Beet and
Vegetable Workers, Season 1968-69", stated : "Transportation will
be supplied by the Federal-Provincial Agricultural Manpower
Committee to those recruited, to Lethbridge only . . . . 11 (241. The
information letter when on to state : "For the return journey the
cost will be $7 .50 per person over 12, and $3 .75 for each one
over 6 and under 12 . Return tickets will be issued from the
Canada Manpower Centre at Lethbridge ."(25) Although workers were
charged for their return transportation, the FPAMC was empowered
to cover all costs incurred by workers and their families . For
example, the 1969 Federal-Provincial Agricultural Agreements,
Schedule "A" Part II, stated that the federal and provincial
governments agreed to share equally the "[tlransportation
expenses of workers and their families and effects moved under
this Agreement . . . . 19 (26)
Sugar beet contracts also stipulated that a habitable house
be provided to the worker . For instance, the Canada Manpower
Centre "Letter f Instruction and Information, Sugar Beet and
Vegetable Industry Workers, Season 1968-69", promised
: "Houses
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are supplied free and vary in size from 2 to 6 rooms, depending
usually on the acres of sugar beets and the number of workers
required to handle the contract ."(27) Houses were equipped with
stove, beds and mattresses . The workers had to provide their own
food, fuel, blankets, cooking utensils, dishes and working tools .
Once the workers signed a contract they could obtain an advance
from their employer to pay for groceries and other needed
essentials .(28)
By the mid-1960s beet farmers were building hostels as
another form of worker housing . The hostels were capable of
accommodating up to 50 workers at one time . In general, the
hostels were clean and in good repair . They had hot and cold
running water, showers, washing machines, dining rooms,
recreation rooms and television . The problem, however, was that
they were overly regimented . The hostel operators set the rules
of conduct for residents and many workers resented these rules .
Consequently, many workers preferred the independence of life in
the separate dwellings . In fact, Steele and Zacharias in their
study argue that the resentment of rules may have contributed to
the difficulty of filling the hostels as well as eventually
bringing the hostel building program to a halt in the late
1960s .(29) So, since Natives began migrating to the sugar beet
fields of southern Alberta separate dwellings accounted for most
of the housing provided to them .
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In the controversy that developed in 1969-70 over the
working conditions of Natives in southern Alberta's sugar beet
industry, housing was a major criticism . In reference to housing
conditions for Natives, the report by Ferguson and Lipton in 1969
stated :
Living conditions for most beet workers are
very poor . Almost all of the buildings provided by
the farmers for them to live in are shacks, converted
granaries and chicken coops. Many of them have only
dirt floors and none have plumbing facilities or easy
access to water .
None have refrigerators or storage areas for fresh
produce . As a result the beet workers' families live on
canned goods for the two to three months they work the
fields .(30)
In 1970, Henry Tomaschuk, a Canadian Labour Congress
representative, did a three week investigation of working and
living conditions in the sugar beet industry . In the report
entitled, "Indian Sugar-Beet Cutters", and published in Canadian
Labour, he stated : "The housing is very poor, often you will find
people living in granaries or just plain rundown shacks . Most
farmers have better barns and pigpens for their livestock ."(31)
Steele and Zacharias' 1971 study also contained similar comments
in reference to Native housing conditions . They stated :
. . .our own first-hand observations convinced us
that many migrant labourers are, in fact, living
out their summers in housing that most people
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would recognize as unacceptably substandard . In
some cases, they're in chicken coops or converted
granaries . In one instance, the farmer moved the
chickens out just before the workers arrived and,
later, the chickens tried to return home for the
night .(32)
During the housing controversy in southern Alberta's sugar
beet industry in 1969-70, it was the responsibility of the FPAMC
to inspect the housing that growers provided for workers
recruited under the sponsored movement . FPAMC officials usually
did their first inspection of housing in March prior to the
beginning of the beet season . However, what was
that there were no basic criteria for defining
an acceptable dwelling and one that should be
1969, for instance, the FPAMC "Inspection Report
Labour Housing" had categories for "conditions
problematic: was
what constituted
rejected .(33) In
on Agricultural
of walls", "of
ceiling", "of roof" and "Is the house suitable? If answer to last
question is No, state what you feel is required to bring this
house up to the required standard ."(34) Nowhere on the' Inspection
Report did it state what the "required standard" might have been .
As a re-salt, judgments as to what was acceptable housing was
arbitrary-and subjective . In other words, it was left up to the
FPAMC inspector to decide whether or not a dwelling was suitable
for migrant workers to occupy . Moreover, many of the inspectors
were themselves either farmers or ex-farmers and thus many Native
workers questioned whether or not they were able to make an
objective judgment .(35) In Steele and Zacharias' study they
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conclude that the "absence of criteria for housing
standards . . . and the lack of adequate controls together give the
whole inspection program an air meaninglessness and
superficiality .(36)
Although the FPAMC inspected housing provided for workers in
the sponsored movement, there was some controversy over the
inspection of grower housing for freelance workers . That is, in
the late 1960s approximately half of the migrant labour in the
beet fields was freelance and thus outside of the sponsored
movement .(37) And, although the FPAMC inspectors could refuse to
provide Manpower recruited labour to beet farmers who did not
maintain an adequate housing standard, " it had no control over
those farmers who simply hired freelance labour and housed them
in the very conditions the inspectors had rejected ."(38)
In 1969 when the housing conditions for migrant workers in
the sugar beet industry was a hotly debated topic in the media,
the ASBGA Labour Report Chairman, Walter Strom, responded to the
issue in the Association's annual report by stating : "Housing
inspection was again carried out by the Federal-Provincial
Committee . The comments made at our meeting indicates that our
labour housing has been improved year by year . . . . In 1970 our
housing inspection will include .all housing used for beet labour .
This is something we have done before and we are merely returning
to a former practice ."(39) However, the Report of an Independent
Committee of Inquiry Established to Examine the Conditions of
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MigrantWorkers intheSugarBeet Industryin Alberta of 1970
stated : "Despite the statement by Mr . W . Strom, Chairman of the
Labour Committee of the Alberta Beet Growers, in his 1969 report
to the Association, 'that all housing used by the migrant force
would be inspected in 1970', this proved not to be the case .
Housing for use by freelance workers is presently not
inspected ."(40) The report went on to state : "With regard to the
non-inspected housing used by freelance workers, it is our
observation that it is frequently substandard ."(41) The report
ended its discussion on migrant labour housing conditions as
follows :
As long as the Growers' Association tolerates this
kind of attitude on the part of some of its members,
then the charge of exploitation will continue to be
heard . The answer to the problem is to require that
all housing be inspected and farmers offering
unsatisfactory accommodation forfeit access to the
labour force .
By way of excusing very poor accommodation the
investigators frequently were told that the properties
are at times very badly abused by the temporary
occupants . This is not a mitigating factor . Wilful
damage to property can be dealt with through the
standard procedures available in our society . If
persons abusing property are not proceeded against,
it implies that the owner is indifferent to the
property and cares not what condition it is in . A
grower with concern for his property and concerned
about providing good accommodation would be expected
to seek normal recompense from those damaging his
property .(42)
In the years immediately following the criticism of migrant
labour housing, the ASBGA requested that assistance through the
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Federal-Provincial agreement be provided to individual farmers to
improve worker housing .(43) The request
funding was provided for up to 40% of the total cost of
improvements .(44) Funding for upgrading of worker housing was
provided to farmers in various forms until 1983 when it was
cancelled by the government .(45)
Sugar Beet Workers and the Labour Laws
Added to relatively poor working conditions of the migrant
labour force in southern Alberta's sugar beet fields was the fact
that the workers were offered basically no protection through
labour laws . Numerous federal
	
and provincial labour laws
explicitly excluded the agricultural worker . In 1966, Gil
Schonning, an official of the federal Department of Labour,
summarized the federal and provincial laws that excluded farm
workers as follows :
(1) Statutory school-leaving age
In all of the provinces there is a compulsory
school attendance law but in many of the
provinces exemptions are permitted for
employment in agriculture .
(2) Minimum age for employment
No minimum age has been established for
employment in agriculture .
(3) Minimum wage legislation
was granted in 1970 and
(4)
	
Equal pay,
(5) Hours of work
(6) Weeklyrestday
(8) Publicholidays
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Farm labour is everywhere excluded from
minimum wage regulations .
While most of the provinces have an equal pay
law, as a general rule this law does not apply
to employment in agriculture .
Five provinces have laws which regulate working
hours but none of these laws apply to employment
in agriculture .
All provinces except Prince Edward Island provide
for a weekly rest day for all or nearly all
employed persons except farm workers .
(7) Annual vacations with pay
Annual vacations are provided for by law in eight
of the provinces . Farm workers are excluded in all
provinces .
Provincial laws dealing with public holidays
generally do not apply to farm workers .
(9) Fair employment practices
Farm workers are not included in provincial
laws which prohibit discrimination on the
grounds of race, colour, religion, and national
origin .
(10) Notice of termination of employment
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Quebec and Nova Scotia
have legislation requiring an employer or
employee to give notice of termination of
employment . These laws do not apply to farm
workers .
(11) Workmen's Compensation
(12) UnemploymentInsurance
(13) LabourRelations
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Agricultural workers were excluded from compulsory
coverage in all provinces until 1965 when the
provision of the Ontario law stating that the Act
did not apply to the industry of farming was
deleted . New regulations will be issued extending
the protection of the Act to farm workers . It is
proposed to bring these workers under the Act from
January 1, 1966 .
Employment in agriculture is one of the main
categories of employment exempted from provisions
of the Unemployment Insurance Act .
The Labour Relations Acts of Prince Edward Island,
New Brunswick, Ontario, Alberta and British
Columbia exclude agriculture . Agriculture is not
excluded in the Acts of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia,
Manitoba and Saskatchewan . Under the Quebec Act
farm workers are not excluded but the legislation
applies only to farms which have three or more
employees .(46)
Throughout most of the history of the sugar beet industry,
agricultural workers were excluded from federal and provincial
labour laws . Moreover, even where there was no specific exclusion
and the labour laws were broad enough to include employment in
agriculture, they may not have been applied to farm workers .(47)
The fact_ that agricultural workers were exempted from most
provincial and federal labour laws reflected the relative
political power of the farmers as opposed to the relative
powerlessness of farm workers .
Two areas of farm worker exclusion from labour laws that
created a great deal of controversy were the lack of unemployment
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Insurance benefits and Workmen's CorctpensatIon . In fact, the lack
of unemployment insurance benefits was one of the reasons for the
unwillingness of workers to seek employment in the sugar beet
fields . For instance, in 1962 the ASBGA Labour Report Director,
Leith Johnson, stated : "It seems likely that there will continue
to be a loss in our European labour force, as more of these
people seek jobs where unemployment insurance is available .
Unemployment insurance for farm workers seems just as remote as
ever before ."(48)
in 1967 unemployment insurance benefits were made mandatory
for agricultural workers that worked sufficient time at "non-
contract" work to qualify .(49) However, this excluded beet
workers because in signing a contract with growers to do the hand
work on a specified number of acres they were judged to be self-
employed .(50) Moreover, beet workers that signed contracts and
were thus deemed self-employed, could hire workers to fulfill the
obligations of the contract but, if they hired relatives they too
became exempt from coverage whether they were paid wages or
not .(51)
Although the . labour laws excluded compulsory Workmen's
Compensation for agricultural workers, it was possible for
farmers to choose to come under the Act but few did so because
farm coverage was expensive .(52) For instance, in 1977 Walter
Strom of the ASBGA Labour Committee stated :
Last year we reported to you that our
branch of agriculture was being placed under the
Workers Compensation Board, with all our labour,
including contract labour, subject to Workers
Compensation Board coverage . We have not objected
to protection for farm workers, in fact we take a
very positive stand on that ; farm workers should
be protected with accident insurance . We objected
to the very high cost of premiums, at a time when
farm income was falling . . . . Following representations
made by all our groups, the announcement was made,
that the legislation has been withdrawn . Workers
compensation is still available to us, but on a
voluntary basis .(53)
In 1980 a Select Committee
	
the Legislative Assembly on
Workers' Compensation for farmers and farm workers was formed It
recommended that a position paper b prepared on Workers'
Compensation for farmers and farm workers by the Workers'
Compensation Board, the Division of Occupational Health and
Safety and Alberta Agriculture . The position paper was released
in November, 1980 and it stated, "Farmers and Farm Workers in
Alberta should be covered by the Workers Compensation Act" .(54)
In the following year, however, farmers went against providing
compulsory coverage because of the high cost and because as free
enterprisers they wanted to retain the right to choose between
Workmen's Compensation and . several private plans that were
available .(55) As recently as 1991 the issue of Workers'
Compensation was discussed by the ASBGMB's Labour Committee . It
stated the following :
. . All farmer: yt- ould have Worker : ' Compensation
or at least an insurance policy for the protection
of the worker . This would help to bring us in line
with many other industries . At present the premium
for Workers' Compensation $7 .25/$100 .00 is
relatively high but if all farm organizations would
lobby the province to implement a program similar to
the average of other provinces in Canada a premium
level of $3 .00/$100 .00 would perhaps then he more
acceptable for farm workers . Perhaps then, if farmers
could provide the same benefits as a job in the city,
more people would be willing to work on the farm .(56)
The most criticized aspect of the working conditions in the
sugar beet industry was the use of child labour . Moreover, the
federal and provincial labour laws required no minimum age_ for
for employment in agriculture . In many cases, when workers
migrated from their home region they would take along their
families . And, because the workers signed a contract to work a
specified acreage of beets, they could hire their own labour
crew . Thus, the workers inevitably ended up hiring their own
families, including children, to perform beet labour . On the
hand, the sugar beet industry blamed the situation on the parents
of the children while on the other hand, the critics blamed the
the low wages paid to workers by the industry which forced them
to resort to using their own families in order to maximize their
earnings . During the period of 1969-70 when the sugar beet
industry came under heavy criticism for its working conditions,
Ferguson and Lipton stated :
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one
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Child labour is another feature of sugar beet
work . Most of the Indian families have small children
who work side-by-side with their parents in the beet
fields . Most°of the Indians don't like the idea of
their children working in the beet fields, especially
the younger ones of six or seven, but feel they have
no choice if the family is going to feed and clothe
itself . The beet growers cynically exploit the
situation as a device to obtain cheap labour .(57)
In response to the charges of child labour exploitation, in
1969 the ASBGA Labour Committee Chairman, Walter Strom, stated :
"In regard to the charge of recruiting child labour, I make the
following statement . We as beet growers do not employ children .
We employ labour contractors, Indian and otherwise, who provide
their own crews, in many cases their own families . Many of these
people would not come to our fields if we limited employment to
the father only ."(58) While acknowledging the fact that children
were coming to the beet fields, Strom went on to state: "It is
interesting to note that the number of children coming on the
organized movement has been considerably less each year . This
past year there were 72 who came half-fare ."(59) That the
industry and government were well aware that children were going
to thesugar beet fields over the years is evident in the "Letter
of Instruction and Information, Sugar Beet and Vegetable Industry
Workers" for the 1968-69 season put out by the Canada Manpower
Centre in Lethbridge . While referring to the workers share of the
transportation costs it states : "Workers will be required to
repay $10 .00 from their first pay, and children between the ages
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of and 12 acc.onipanying workers will be required to pay
$3 .75 ."(60) In 1970, when critics blamed the provincial
government for not requiring a minimum age for employment in
agriculture in the labour laws, the Premier of Alberta, Harry
Strom, stated: "Child labour in Alberta's sugar beet fields is
the fault of the parents, not the government . . . . "(61) In response
to Premier Strom's position, the leader of the New Democratic
Party in Alberta, Grant Notley, stated :
"When the premier says the problem of child labour
is the fault of the parents, he's side-stepping the
responsibility of the provincial government in this
issue ."
The premier is technically correct in stating that
the workers are independent contractors,and therefore
unprotected from labour laws, "but that still doesn't
make the plight which results any more palatable ."
Provincial laws should be amended to include
migrant workers, he said . . . . (62)
As a result of the criticism of the use of child labour in
the sugar beet fields, the industry moved to stem the flow of
children migrating with the sponsored movement . For the 1970 and
subsequent seasons, this was to be accomplished by denying
recruited workers access to the chartered buses if accompanied by
school age children .(63) However, the study done in late 1970
entitled,
	
Report	f	an Indepentent Committee of Inquiry
Established to Examine the Conditions of Miqrant Workers in the
Sugar Beet Industry in Alberta, stated :
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Despite assurances that school age children of
recruited workers were not allowed to accompany their
parents to the beet fields, a number of youthful
looking persons were seen at the reception center . When
FPAMC personnel were questioned about this, the
committee's field worker was shown a registration book
revealing that with one exception all persons entered
that day in that book claimed to be sixteen years of
age or older . The exception was a youth of 14 years . He
was officially registered as part of the work force and
claimed to have had the Chief's permission to absent
himself from school . The acceptance of this youth by
FPAMC officials and his prior acceptance on the bus by
Canada Manpower appears contrary to stated policy . With
or without permission from the Chief of the band or
anyone else for that matter, 14 year old children
should not be included in the labour force . . . . It is
suspected that persons of 14 or 15 may not infrequently
provide erroneous information with regard to their
age .(64)
The Ferguson and Lipton report in 1969 concerning the
conditions of migrant workers, suggested that in order for
migrant workers to change their circumstances in the beet fields
they had to form a workers' union . They stated :
The only way things will change for the beet
workers will be when they organize and form a
powerful union .
By organizing they can speak with one voice and be
heard .
A powerful organization like the Beet Growers
Association must be confronted by an equally powerful
union in order to balance out the scale .
The union should push for, better working
conditions, higher pay, improved housing and government
benefits such as unemployment insurance and workmens'
compensation .(65)
However, organizing beet workers Into a labour union was
prc.) blematic .
	
In 1970 an article in Canadian Lais(our entitled :
"Alberta's Sugar-Beet Workers" stated :
As Roy Jamha, president of the Alberta Federation
of Labour explains it, the situation cannot, at this
time, be met by normal union organizing methods . One
essential fact is that this - is a short-term operation--
normally mid-May to the latter part of July . This in
itself makes union organization of the workers, who are
scattered across an area of well over a hundred square
miles, difficult . An even more serious handicap is the
fact that they are regarded as agricultural workers and
so are excluded from the provisions of the province's
labour act-- a circumstance which CLC [Canadian Labour
Congress] organizations in Alberta and other provinces
have long tried to have remedied .(66)
During the late 1960s, the Alberta Labour Act had been revised to
make provision for the recognition of groups of workers proved to
be a commercial enterprise . In effect, this would make some
groups, such as beet workers, eligible for union representation .
But, to accomplish the recognition it entailed a prolonged legal
battle . The problem with beet workers was that "[bly the time
they were organized, certification dealt with and probable legal
appeals followed, . their term of employment would have long
ended ."(67)
Native Labour and Racism in the Sugar Beet Industry
Another aspect of the sugar beet industry was that many
people, both within the industry and in the surrounding
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community, held racial stereotypes of Natives and characterized
them as "unreliable" labour .
Initially, many beet farmers had problems accepting Native
workers . But, by 1961 the ASBGA Labour Report Director, Leith
Johnson, was able to assert : "We have good reason to believe that
the grower acceptance of these people is getting better each
year, and the goodwill and business relations between the two
groups are slowly but steadily improving ."(68) Yet, the annual
reports of the ASBGA indicate that it had continuously sought to
find another source of beet workers other than Natives . In 1965
the ASBGA Labour Report Director, Leith Johnson, stressed the
need for another source of labour and pointed out the reasons for
this as follows :
Our Labour Committee has had talks with the
Department of Immigration officials, both in
Lethbridge and Ottawa, about bringing in Mexican
labour or new immigrants from Europe, and have been
informed that there will be no new source of labour
supply opened up for us on a mass movement scale as
long as there are unemployed Indians available to us .
We stressed the desperate need of a new source of
workers other than Indians, for the following reasons :
(1) The growing wide-spread dissatisfaction of growers
with Indian workers . (2) Too many farmers
discontinuing growing beets for the lack of
satisfactory workers . This is hurting the industry as
a whole, which in turn depresses the growth and
expansion of our economy .(69)
Indian Affairs and the FPAMC had been aware for a long time
that beet farmers characterized Indians as unreliable labour .
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Moreover, it was also aware that working conditions had an effect
on the reliability of Indian workers . At the annual Federal-
Provincial Agricultural Manpower Conference held in 1966, the
minutes of the meeting point out that Mr . R .F . Battle, Assistant
Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development,
mentioned that "during the early years of Indian participation in
Alberta harvest operations there had been complaints about
Indians not being reliable workers, but that the Alberta Farm
Labour Committee had found that the problems were mainly caused
by inadequate conditions in housing, education facilities, health
and recreation opportunities ."(70)
Another burden that Natives had to endure in the beet fields
was racism . In 1969, Ferguson and Lipton's report published in
The Native People, accused beet farmers of racism in determining
pay rates for workers . In reference to the wages paid to Natives
for completing either "Operation A" or "Operation B" as outlined
in the contract, they stated :
We found the range in pay, the differences between
the top and bottom rate for any of the operations, is
due to two factors--the dirtiness Neediness) of the
fields and the color of the workers' skin . Indians are
paid less than whites .
We talked to David Courtoreille, an Indian beet
worker, and asked him if he thought racism affected the
wages he was paid . To answer he spoke of a recent
experience of his with a beet farmer .
"Well, he had 12 Hungarian workers there . Now he
paid them $32 an acre . Then I was supposed to do second
hoeing and I got only $3 an acre. The second hoeing is
normally worth $9 an acre . Supposing if we did the
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first hoeing on his piece, we'd only get $12 an acre,
we Indians," he said .(71)
Ferguson zind Lipton went on to state :
In a different setting we talked to Steve Rostic,
a white field worker .
"We (white field workers) get $25 an acre on the
first hoeing and $10 or $11 for the second hoeing," he
told us .
According to these figures white workers get $7
more per acre for the first hoeing than do Indian
workers and one or $2 more per acre for the second
hoeing .(72)
In 1971, Steele and Zacharias' study on the sugar beet
industry "tried to gauge the attitudes of the resident community
towards the migrants, and to determine what community leaders and
farmers and official contacts felt were the big problems that
accompanied the arrival each year of the Indian and Metis ."(73)
The responses they received were largely- stereotyped opinions .
They stated :
We were frequently told that Indians were lazy and
unable to hold their liquor . Many people felt it had
been a mistake to open the bars to Indians three years
earlier . . Alcohol, they felt, was a major contributor to
the social and labour problems that the migrant labour
force had created . People agreed that there were many
"good" Indian beet workers but they often suggested too
that, as a rule, Indians were unreliable and incapable .
Others told us Indians did not know the value of money
and tended foolishly to blow their summer's earnings .
Some farmers thought that the appropriate government
agencies should be responsible for whatever social
problems result from the presence in the area of
migrant labour ; and others, who had tried to talk with
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Indians, complained that it was difficult to
communicate with them in a meaningful way .(74)
Steele and Zacharias also found that
Indians experienced a
great deal of discrimination,
particularily when they were in a
city in sugar beet country . In relation to discrimination against
_Indians, they stated : "It will surprise
Indians say there's quite a bit of it . They often find it
difficult to get into hotels . If they do get in and then trouble
breaks out they know that, no matter who started the trouble, the
odds are the Indians will be the first ones arrested ."(75)
The Economic Importance of Native Labour in the Sugar Beet
Industry
A commonly held perception is that Natives have contributed
little to the commercial and industrial development of Canada
following the decline of the fur trade
.(76) However, in the case
of southern Alberta's sugar beet industry, without Native labour
the industry could not have survived
. In spite of this Native
workers had their characters assassinated, were racially
stereotyped and were referred to as unreliable labour
.
The sugar beet industry was vital to the economic well being
of southern Alberta . For instance, in the 1969 annual report of
the ASBGA, President, Lalovee Jensen, stated
: "Sugar beets have
again proven to be the great stablizer and income equalizer on
no one to hear that
our irrigated farms . Without this
crop there would be real
hardship and economic difficulty in our
farming area . If there is
a bright spot in the agricultural
economy of this province it is
to be found on the Alberta
farms where sugar beets are
grown ."(77) In Steele and Zacharias'
study of the sugar beet
industry in 1971, they pointed out
that southern Alberta farmers
grew a variety of crops such as barley, alfalfa, potatoes, oats,
flax and rye but, sugar beets were the most profitable . Moreover,
45% of the farmers they interviewed told them that "without the
beets, they simply could not continue farming .'(78)
If sugar beets were essential to the farming economy of
southern Alberta, then so were the Natives who supplied the
necessary labour for beet cultivation . In 1970 John Schmidt of
TheCalgaryHerald, acknowledged the contribution that Natives
made to the survival of the sugar
beet industry in southern
Alberta by stating
: "Had Indian beet workers not undertaken to
come in from northern reserves about 10 years ago this industry
would have been finished because no white labour union would
undertake to supply it with men ."(79)
In 1971, Steele and Zacharias' study summed up the plight of
the Native beet worker in southern Alberta's beet fields at that
time
. However, their comments are applicable to all the Natives
who laboured in the beet fields throughout the entire period that
the state was involved in their recruitment and movement for
employment in southern Alberta
. They stated :
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The position of the migrant Indian worker or Metis
worker in the sugar beet fields of southern Alberta
is
not enviable . They are the only people left who are
willing to do the work that's absolutely essential to
the health of one of the West's most important cash
crops . They alone are prepared to do the sweaty work
that, quite literally, keeps many farmers from giving
up farming . They do hard, hot demanding work at a rate
of pay that, over the term of their employment, can
only be called poor . The government recruits them and
then offers them little protection, and almost no
useful information .(79)
Conclusion
Throughout most of the period that the state recruited-and
moved Natives to southern Alberta's sugar beet industry many
laboured under deplorable working conditions . They suffered
through various kinds of exploitation and discrimination . In some
instances, farmers would short-change workers in their earnings .
To add insult to injury, the wages workers did receive for beet
work were low in comparison to other sectors of the economy
. Also
beet farmers were able to exploit Native workers once they signed
a beet contract
. Workers were forced to fulfill the terms of the
contract because it was legally binding
. As a result, some
farmers were
able to exploit workers by forcing them to perform
excess labour . i n
particular,, they enforced the three-dollar per
acre hold-back clause until they felt that the work had been done
to their satisfaction
. The housing that farmers provided to
workers was clearly inadequate
. Again, farmers were able to
exploit workers by not upgrading housing standards and thereby
lowering their costs for worker housing maintenance . Moreover,
although it was the FPAMC's job to inspect beet housing, the lack
of clearly defined guidelines for accepting or rejecting housing
meant that the inspector's opinion was largely subjective . The
end result was that much of the housing that passed inspection
was substandard . However, probably the most detestable aspect of
the exploitation in the beet industry was the use of child
labour . For years the FPAMC was aware of the use of child labour
in the beet fields . In fact, the worker contract stipulated that
children were to be charged for part
	
their transportation
costs to the beet fields . Athough the industry blamed the beet
worker for hiring children to labour in the beet fields, it has
been pointed out that the wages paid to contract workers were so
low, this forced them to put their children to work in order to
maximize earnings .
Natives also had to endure discrimination and racist
attitudes while employed in the sugar beet industry . Initially,
many beet farmers had difficulty accepting Native workers .
Moreover, because of racist attitudes, some farmers paid Native
workers less than white workers for completing the same job
.
Natives were stereotyped as being lazy and as drunks
. When Native
workers went to the cities in the sugar beet growing area, many
were discriminated against in hotels and by the police
. In
general, Natives in the sugar beet industry were characterized as
unreliable labour .
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Chapter Six : Conclusion
The aim of this research has been twofold . Empirically, it
sought to examine the social process whereby a group of Native
people who lived on reserves in northern Alberta and Saskatchewan
came to migrate hundreds of kilometers to work in the sugar beet
industry in southern Alberta . Within that context the main
theoretical aim of this research was to explore the conceptual
links between the state, migration, and the reserve army of
labour . Using the case of the sugar beet industry in southern
Alberta, the question this research set out to answer was, "what
has been the role of the Canadian state concerning the migration
of Native labour to southern Alberta's sugar beet industry"?
Through an analysis of archival material, which included various
federal and provincial government documents, annual reports of
the Alberta Sugar Beet Growers' Association, newspapers and other
material, this thesis demonstrated that the state, indeed, played
a key role in the recruitment, movement and retention of Native
workers for the sugar beet industry .
Arguably, much of the Native population of Canada can be
categorized as belonging to the reserve army of labour . In fact,
out of the three sectors of the reserve army of labour that Marx
identifies, the floating, the latent, and the stagnant, many
Natives fit into the latter category because of their irregular,
casual, arid marginal employment . Seen as obstacles in the way of
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capitalist development and agricultural settlement during the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, Indians signed treaties and
were placed on reserves . Within the context of the Indian Act of
1876 which was administered by Indian Affairs, Indians on
reserves were to be taught the ways of Euro-Canadians and then
moved into mainstream society . Until this was accomplished
Indians on reserves possessed a restricted range of citizenship
rights . However, the reserve system was contradictory because
instead of preparing Indians for incorporation into agricultural
and wage labour activities, it ended up isolating and
marginalizing Indian people from the wider society . In effect,
reserves became islands of relatively unskilled labour which
employers could draw workers from when necessary and pay them at
comparatively low wage rates . Historical evidence suggests for
example, that following the fur trade, Native workers played
important roles in many industries across the country which
required casual and low cost labour .(1)
In chapter one, it was suggested that within the Marxist
perspective, capitalist society must be understood in terms of
its mode of production which creates relations of domination and
exploitation between social classes . In other words, the
capitalist class exploits the working class . The state is seen as
functioning to help maintain these relations . Thus, one of the
fundamental roles of the state is to create the conditions for
capital_ accumulation . It accomplishes this by using its power to
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the benefit of the capitalist class . The state must also create
the conditions for social harmony between
	
classes . Thus, the
state's role is complex in that it has to help
the conditions for capitalist exploitation and at the same time
help engineer social harmony . Although it can use physical force
to maintain social order, it rarely does as social harmony
between the classes is accomplished by other policies and
methods .
In chapter two, the case of migrant labour in South Africa
was briefly examined as it provides some useful insights into
understanding the relationship between the state, migration and
the reserve army of labour . South Africa the state was
actively involved in assisting employers recruit and retain
African workers who were resident in nominally independent
homelands on a migrant labour basis . While the initial intentions
behind the formation of the reserve system in Canada may not have
been the same as in South Africa, one of the consequences of its
formation here was that Native people in some cases came to form
part of the reserve army of labour .
Chapter three of this thesis was an analysis of the
structure of the sugar beet industry in southern Alberta . It was
suggested that farmers generally received very low prices from
B .C . Sugar for their beet crops . The low price paid for sugar
beets in Canada was linked t the price f sugar on the world
market . Whenever there was a world surplus of sugar it was dumped
create and sustain
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on the world market by sugar producing countries at very low
prices . Canada dealt on the world sugar market and therefore its
domestic price for sugar was set on the low price of this market .
This meant that B .C . Sugar had to sell sugar in Canada at this
low price which, in turn, meant that it had to buy its sugar
beets from farmers at a very low price in order to make a profit .
In many years farmers were provided with a government subsidy
whenever their returns fell below a specific price level . Also,
it was found that farmers suffered from increasing costs of
production . In particular, the costs of machinery, fertilizer and
herbicidies increased dramatically which lowered their profit
margin .
Chapter four was an examination of the role that various
federal and provincial departments played in linking Indian
people in northern Alberta and Saskatchewan with the southern
Alberta sugar beet industry . Throughout most of the history of
the sugar beet
Although beet farmers had
industry, farmers found it very difficult to
acquire sufficient workers t
	
fill their labour requirements .
little control over the price they
received for their beet crops and little control over the
increasing costs of machinery, fertilizer and herbicides, they
could exercise some control over the conditions of work . Control
over the conditions of work was facilitated by the lack of labour
law protection for. the workers . Moreover, the fact that
agricultural workers were excluded from most of the labour laws
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in Alberta suggests that farmers possessed relatively more power
than workers . Because of relatively low pay compared to other
forms of work, and the difficulty of the work, few individuals
wanted to work in the beet fields ; not immigrants nor Euro-
Canadian workers . For immigrants who were recruited during the
early history of the sugar beet industry, wage work in the
industry was usually temporary stepping stone to better
opportunities in the Canadian economy . This is part of the reason
why the state had to search for sources of labour from within
Canada to work in the sugar beet industry . In the early 1950s
when the sugar beet industry could no longer acquire immigrant
workers for beet work, the state intervened through the Federal-
Provincial Agricultural Manpower Committee (FPAMC) and Indian
Affairs to recruit northern reserve Indians . In other words, the
state moved to recruit workers from the reserve army of labour
existing on northern reserves in Alberta and Saskatchewan .
The federal part of the FPAMC was represented by officials
of the Department of Manpower and Immigration . They were part of
the federal administrative apparatus that, in part, represented
the interests of Canadian employers who required assistance in
acquiring workers . The Department f Indians Affairs, in part,
represents Indians and administers to them through the Indian Act
and the reserve system . This relationship has defined Indians as
colonial people and marginalized their participation in Canadian
society
. In general, Natives in Canada form part of the reserve
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army of labour and, in cases where they
are incorporated into
certain industries, part of the working class . Consequently, the
representation of Indians through Indian Affairs is not equal to
the representation of dominant classes because of their
subordinate position in the social relations of production . Thus,
it follows that
	
the federal administrative level, the
development interests of employers tend to take
precedence over
the interests of Indians . In short, FPAMC officials
were part of
the "power bloc" within the federal government that
possessed
decision-making powers in terms of agricultural production
.
The mandate of the
FPAMC was to recruit workers and move
them areas of need in the agricultural sectors throughout
Canada . In the early 1950s when the state intervened through the
FPAMC and Indian Affairs to recruit Native workers from northern
Alberta and Saskatchewan to work in southern Alberta's beet
fields, it helped supply farmers with the needed labour to ensure
the production of their sugar beet crops .
Soon after the sugar beet industry started using Native
labour, the recruitment pattern of the state was well
established . Within the FPAMC, the provincial part of the
Committee assessed the labour requirements of farmers for the
upcoming beet season . This information was then passed on to
Committee officials of the Department of
Manpower and .
Immigration . The recruitment of the workers was carried out by
Canada Manpower Centres with the assistance of Indian Affairs
.
Once the beet season commenced, regional offices of Canada
Manpower sent application forms to the chiefs and band council on
the reserves . The successful Native applicants were transported
to southern Alberta by chartered buses . Once the workers arrived
in southern Alberta FPAMC officials allocated the workers to the
farmers . Many of the costs associated with the recruitment and
movement of Native migrant workers were shared equally between
the Alberta provincial government and the Department of Manpower
and Immigration .
Because workers were reluctant to perform beet work, the
state initiated a variety of mechanisms designed to encourage
Native workers to remain in the employment of beet farmers . In
regard to Native workers in the sponsored movement, the state
provided incentives such as chartered buses and paid for most of
their transportation costs to the beet fields . It also provided
farmers with funding to build hostels, and provided funds to
upgrade worker housing . While likely motivated partly by goodwill
but also partly by self-interest, the state and the sugar beet
industry shared the cost of admission for Natives to attend the
annual stampedes in sugar beet regions . The state also appears to
have used economic pressure to help recruit workers . As noted in
chapter four, the main mechanism appears to have been the use of
threats of termination of welfare benefits . It is unclear from
this research whether or not benefits were actually terminated
for those who were able-bodied and who refused to work in the
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beet fields . This is a question which requires further historical
and ethnographic research to fully answer . However, by using
these measures to help recruit and retain Native workers for the
sugar beet industry, the state provided farmers with the needed
labour in order to complete the process of sugar beet production .
The recruitment of Native workers by the state for
employment in the sugar beet industry likely served the interests
of both Native workers and beet farmers . Beet work did provide
Native workers with a source of income that might have otherwise
not been available . Arguably, it could also have provided Natives
with the "experience" which many employers require for more
regular employment .
In relation to farmers, there does appear to have been a net
economic gain associated with the employment of Native workers in
this industry . While this thesis did not provide actual data on
the rate of exploitation of Native workers as defined in this
thesis, it did indicate that there was economic value obtained
from using Native workers . However, the thesis did show that the
value of Native workers was noted several times by industry
representatives and individual farmers themselves .
Further evidence which indicates that farmers benefitted
economically from the use of Native labour is provided by a study
of the industry undertaken by the federal Department of
Agriculture for the period between 1966 and 1968 . During this
period Native participation in the sugar beet industry averaged
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around 2,000 workers per season .(2) The study, entitled The
Economics of Sugar Beet Production in	Alberta, found the
breakdown of the sugar beet grower's dollar was as follows :
Return for profit and management	33 .7c
Machine costs	 27 .6c
Labour costs 21 .5c
Seed, herbicides, fertilizer	8 .9c
Land costs	 8 .3c(3)
What this data indicates is that for each dollar that -a sugar
beet farmer earned from the sale of beets, the total costs of
production came to 66 .3 cents . Of those costs of production,
labour came to 21 .5 cents, machinery 27 .6 cents, seed, herbicides
and fertilizer 8 .9 cents, and land costs 8 .3 cents . This left a
return for "profit and managment" of 33 .7 cents . During this
period, the study further indicated that the profit per acre
associated with sugar beet production was $88 .97 per acre or
$5 .95 per ton .(4)
Furthermore, a study conducted by Steele and Zacharias, and
which was published by Information Canada in 1971 states that
sugar beets :
. .are the most profitable of all these crops
.[i .e .
barley, alfalfa, potatoes, mustard, oats, flax, rye,
canning crops and seed peas] Eighty-five percent of the
farmers we interviewed defined sugar beets as their
this industry .
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best cash crop . Moreover, more than half indicated
they'd prefer to have larger sugar beet contracts than
the ones they had ; and 45% said that, without the
beets, they simply could not continue farming .(5)
While it is difficult to determine whether the apparent
profitability of the sugar beet farmers was solely due to the use
of Native migrant workers, this thesis does suggest that there
was some economic gain associated with the state's assistance in
making Native workers available .
Clearly, more research is needed in order to understand the
full dynamics of the relationship between the state, migration
and the reserve army of labour in the southern Alberta sugar beet
industry . As already noted, further research is necessary
specifically on the question of whether welfare benefits were
actually terminated for Native people who refused to participate
in this migratory flow . Also, given the size of the movement,
more research is required on Natives peoples', and farmers'
experiences in the industry . This would be useful in order to
explore more fully the dynamics of racism, which as this thesis
indicated in a preliminary fashion, seemed to play a role in
determining rates of pay and housing conditions . Finally, more
research is required on the comparative economic value associated
with the use of different social categories of workers, as well
as the roles and intentions of various branches of the state in
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